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
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THE LANTERN OF DIOGENES

THE HUNGER FOR HUSKS

¶ One of the most distressing of all the phenomena of our day, as probably of all others, is the willingness to accept appearances in the stead of fact.

¶ The educator has an unhappy consciousness that many of his students care nothing at all for an education if only by hook or crook they can be handed certain educational husks, such as degrees, diplomas, the rights to a mortar board, a sleeve, a bit of color, a hood, a button, a key, the Commencement Day Parade, and a quaff at the Class Day punch-bowl.

¶ Some view such a situation as peculiar to our time and to the present generation of youth, but indications are otherwise. Many a man has voluntarily died for a foolish dare, a ribbon, a feminine smile, or a handful of gold, who would not for a moment have considered death for a holy cause or the general interests of humanity.

¶ If the younger generation show this propensity, they are but copying the manners and outlooks of their fathers. This is the vice in which the world is steeped. To show our superiority to others by a display of wealth, or clothes, or educational degrees, or the acceptance of public office, and to find satisfaction in the accompanying pomp, is to indicate the exhibitionism of spoiled children and to declare our appetite for husks.

¶ At first sight such may seem but the harmless diversion of infantile and too easily satisfied minds, but when it invades the college campus it becomes the fruitful mother of all sorts of sophistries, and pedan-

tries shifting the emphasis from culture to standings, from education to biological curves, giving rise to many insufferable intellectual snobberies.

¶ In the church it emphasizes distinctive doctrines, ecclesiastical mannerisms, and that foul brood of peculiarities which turn emphasis away from godliness to form and keep good men from mutual understanding and co-operation in bringing the Kingdom of God.

¶ In the state it gives sense of importance and feeling of greatness and wisdom to self-seeking, vicious, ignorant or little men who have been able to buy or to bluff their way into public office, but to whom the welfare of society is secondary to the desire for standing and opulence.

¶ This spirit has been equally ruinous in business life, for it puts all the emphasis on the plate-glass front and none on the quality of the goods produced or the integrity of the firm involved. Few are the men who are content with the safe and honest profits that arise from reputation alone without any aid from display windows and jazz advertising.

¶ In society at large we have much hurrying and scurrying to see who is going to follow in the train of some social bubble that looks beautiful but is about to burst. Society is loaded down with people who are trying to pass as social leaders, wits, literateurs, poets, and musicians; who are not satisfied to await the verdict of time but must perforce have their greatness already acclaimed even if they have to drag in their friends to dinners and teas to applaud their mediocre talents.

¶ Such is the dry-rot that is eating out the structure of our American life, which rests on the foundations of insincerity and make-believe. We are far hungrier for the appearance of values than we are for the toil, labor, and sacrifice by which alone values can arise. We would fain satisfy our appetites with husks which are fit only for swine.

¶ The only remedy for this disease is a wholesome and widespread repentance. That is a beggarly type of civilization which is characterized by a hunger for husks.

R. T. F.

¶ As *The Personalist* goes to press, the Editor is completing arrangements for a World tour which will include an extended sojourn in the Orient. During the Summer he will be in Europe, where he plans to attend the Eighteenth International Congress of Philosophy, which meets at Prague, Czechoslovakia, in the first week of September. After this he will journey to Peiping, China, where he has been appointed Visiting Professor in Philosophy for the fall semester.

¶ During his absence *The Personalist* will be in the hands of Professor Wilbur H. Long and Mr. H. Jeffery Smith. Readers will not lose touch with Dr. Flewelling, however, but rather will be carried with him on his journey; for he is contemplating a series of articles on his observations of the world situation, entitled "*Reflections of a Peripatetic.*"

H. J. S.

The Personalist

A QUANTUM VIEW OF HISTORY

By THE EDITOR

IT will seem to many an odd notion to apply the quantum theory to history. To such it will probably appear that in atomic action quanta find their sole justification. The principle is revolutionary, even in physics, and it may appear a case of "fools rush in where angels fear to tread" even to suggest the application of a physical principle to a whole cosmic, as well as social, order. However, if there are any complaints from the house of the scientists, we have as a ready answer that it was they who first insisted on the application of scientific principles to all phases of human experience, and if they find the battle going against them through a more rigorous science, they of all men have the least right to complain.

The theory of the continuity of force in physics has for many generations been one of the surest of basic assumptions. Predictability has been the proud boast of science over both philosophy and religion. These latter disciplines seemed so insusceptible to any mathematical, measurable, ponderable demonstration that it has been common for the scientist to declare them therefore negligible, since they do not yield to demonstration or proof. For this reason the scientific world was philosophically unprepared to receive the shocking and revolutionary discovery of Max Planck that forces are not continuous but discontinuous, that they move in waves like the beat of the surf on the shore, that the action of individual atoms is unpredictable, that the so-

called iron-bound laws of nature hold only in a general way and not in particular cases, that what we really observe are statistical averages upon which we have to depend. Even in the physical world there is a demand for organization. Evermore an organism of some kind seems necessary to explain all activity on any scale, anywhere. The downfall of the ancient tyranny of purposeless mechanism can be safely predicted.

Since the quantum theory is coming to wide acceptance among physicists, it may not be amiss to inquire if its application is to be confined to a single phase of nature, the activity of the atom. In biology we have been long lost in the barren and fruitless search for the so-called "missing link." This has been nothing more nor less than a doddering trust against light in the security of our hypothesis that force is only continuous and always in a single direction, that of evolution. The theory has always raised more questions than it answered, and the poverty of results should have led us to abandon it long ago. Emergent evolution, as it is now called, is an effort to let ourselves down easily from a position which even the blindest of evolutionists was beginning to discover to be no longer logically tenable. It is easier now to understand that evolution may be an illustration of the quantum principle—it may proceed by jumps or mutations, and there may be no need for a "missing link." Thus the "missing link" is seen as merely the hobgoblin of Darwinian hypothesis.

Our view of the formation of the earth itself is taking on new aspects. We have thought that in the interests of theories of nature the making of the earth could be viewed only as the part of a universal process. It seemed unscientific to regard it as in any sense a unique occurrence. There must be countless other earths, with atmospheres and vege-

table life and stores of metal, oil, and multitudinous supplies for animal subsistence. Not to think so was unscientific, and displayed an ignorant provincialism quite unworthy and narrow. However, it now seems possible that the earth was formed by a unique cataclysm, a collision of asteroids, such as may never have taken place before nor since. There seems a sense in which the quantum theory would apply to the forming of the earth.

The theory seems even more applicable in the field of history, for here we find that there have been certain periods of history which in achievement and results have appeared the possessors of powers unknown to any other age. Such periods have occurred which have set particular human achievements forward to a state little short of perfection and which have become the standards and the despair of later generations. Such a period arose in the concept of moral law in the days of Hammurabi and later of Moses. Such a period was the high water mark of Greek philosophy and sculpture. Such a period was that of Rome when the genius for empire and world-peace reached its climax. Such a period saw the invention and development of Gothic architecture, appearing, it might almost be said, like a sudden inspiration out of the nowhere into the here and subsiding like an exhausted flame after a brief period of seventy-five years. Such a period may be that of modern science and business organization, typified by the vast steel and concrete structures which mar our cities while they constitute the marvel of our age. There are evidences that our genius for organization may have exhausted itself, and that in the future the changes of society may be so vast that these vacant and unprofitable structures may grow as rusty as are the empty cathedrals of an older day. Whether we are entering upon the light of a new renaissance, or plung-

ing into the shadows of a new dark age, who can tell?— but there can be no doubt of the momentous character of the days that have called us into being and placed in our hands the future of the human race.

In each of the previous periods humanity seemed to have spent itself, and to have become incapable of carrying further the high emprise. Is history about to repeat itself, or are there elements in the situation now that have never been present in the epochal crises of the past? Here seems to lie the narrow pathway of a larger hope, and the only hope maybe, for future progress. The following are perhaps the vital questions which must be answered.

Does our world differ from the ancient and passing civilizations in the general dissemination of culture? New phases of civilization, new developments of already achieved civilization, are never secure so long as they remain in the hands of the few. It was doubtless the parochialism of Grecian education that made possible the quenching of her intellectual torch. She made no effort to bring the lowest members of society up to the standards of the highest. Much the same might be contended as the case in every other instance. The priceless secrets of civilization were kept in the hands of a small dominant class, the priesthood, some esoteric, cultural fellowship, some political free-masonry. And then because the untutored masses were so prolific, any sweeping social change, epidemic, political disorganization, pressure from barbaric hordes, each of a thousand different types of events, has been sufficient to turn a classical civilization to nothingness, or at least to a memory and a regret. There is an element of hope in the wider dissemination of ideas that characterizes our age.

A further source of cultural collapse has been in the provincialism of ancient achievements. They have been con-

finned to small areas, to small extensions of time, to national boundaries that could be swept away by war, or other disaster, and even by civil disintegration. Rapid transportation, the radio, organized educational facilities, widespread literacy, knowledge of printing, vast collections of books in many places—these are facilities making for the preservation of culture which no other period has known in equal degree. There have never before been in the hands of men such world-wide capacities for the dissemination of ideas—such powers of universal appeal—such possibility of arriving at quick and widespread world understanding.

One other question must be held as vital to our situation. Perhaps the most significant fact about our age since the world war, and certainly more recently, has been the sense of insecurity. This mood is in one sense paralyzing, fruitful of inhibitions of the worst sort. This is the psychological effect of fear. It easily accounts for the surprising reversion to nationalistic sentiment and narrowed concepts of world responsibility so powerful at the moment. But this same uncertainty may easily be the forerunner of a better day. Especially if man can be brought to a new spiritual achievement. Uncertainty can be accepted with fear, or it may be accepted as a challenge to the higher powers of man. Perhaps the most illuminating question of all will be whether our age has within it the spiritual resources to turn the sense of insecurity into one of victory for a new and better civilization. These are the questions that we must face.

I.

Dependence of World-Culture Upon Ideas

Every epoch-marking culture has resulted from the rise of controlling ideas that have conspired in the same direction. Men have been deeply moved by similar thoughts,

and out of that simultaneity in time, place, and background they have been able to advance a given outlook to its highest possible perfection. But such achievement does not spring except from convictions so deep that they seize upon both the emotions and the imagination. It may be the inspired dream of universal moral law, promising to remake a world, as in Babylonia and India; or the appreciation of beauty as proportion, where beauty is seen to represent cosmic law and order, as in Greece. It may arise from burning religious conviction coupled with a dream of a new freedom for the human spirit, as in the rearing of the Gothic cathedrals. But everywhere it conquers as a dominant idea pervading many minds.

The question arising is, then, whether or not our age is capable of ideas of sufficient moment. That it has been widely moved is evidenced by the epoch of clever invention, of high-powered organization, of exhaustive command of the physical powers of nature. But we have come to the end of what these powers can do for us. Our success as organizers has all but ended our civilization, even as Frankenstein was nearly destroyed by the monster he had created. The only forward step which lies in that direction is the mechanically complete organization of an oppressive communism. In such organization the individual must fall prey to the institution. There could be neither individual initiative nor freedom; the whole concept is implacably hostile to the ideas that have been so laboriously engendered in western culture for twenty-five centuries. We may even now be witnessing the final conflict between the program of a free society and a complete paternalism. But paternalism with the necessary autocrat at the head is not only repugnant to western notions but the idea has so clearly failed in history that we already know its outcome. The

new idea that can save modern culture from collapse cannot therefore come along the line of organization unless it contain some other and transforming idea. What shall this be? The easy way will be to assume that the problem is one of more organization—the application of big business on a world-wide scale, somewhat as the Medievalists presumed that the cathedrals had made their theological ideals forever secure, just at the moment when the revolting minds of the Reformation were about to make them forever insecure. The idea must possess something more than organization. In general it must bear a promise of universal benefit, it must be easily understood by and communicated to the greater portion of world citizens; it must be sufficiently cosmopolitan—that is, human—to appeal to all classes, faiths, conditions of men; and it must be so freighted both with conviction and emotion as to move the greater part of mankind with a common impulse. These qualifications cannot be fulfilled by any promise of organization, however great, unless the vastness of the benefits to be realized shall reach past all the divisions of warring nationalities, races, sects, and religions. It must reach up into the moral and partake of the spiritual.

For this great end nothing would seem to suffice short of a theophany. But the pressing need is that the thought of mankind should run ahead, far ahead, of its actual achievement. Once an idea has become so visualized, so vivid, and so widespread in the minds of men that it touches the imagination, the swift transition to a new order of civilization is possible overnight. It needs but the disturbing jar of a world heroism, a transcendent deed, to cause crystallization in the whole mass of society.

II.

The New Capacity for the Dissemination of Ideas

To this end our own age is in possession of powers that have never before been known in the history of mankind. The invention of space-destroying machinery such as the steamship, the airplane, the telephone, the wireless, and the radio—these are rapidly bringing about a homogeneity in ideas such as has before been utterly impossible. Heretofore it has been an insuperable task for widely divided races to possess ideas in common; now they are so close together in trade, in health, in political fortunes, in community of interest and ideas, that they must be moved by a common concern or else all must perish. The new capacity for sharing ideas has removed the last security from any autocratic or tyrannical or conservative organization. We cannot successfully hold the parochial mind when the world has become one vast whispering gallery. To endeavor by various repressions to keep out the influx of new and contradictory and revolutionary ideas is a task as unpromising as the attempt to sweep back a Bay of Fundy tide with a housewife's broom. Of course there is the danger arising from perilous ideas. Humanity may be stampeded into running amuck. Some noble conservators in our midst are sure there is salvation only in their own ideas, and would undertake the benevolent task of censorship, but the fates are out of the box and nothing but the destruction of the machinery of locomotion, of dispatch of information, can now shut us back into the old small-town ways and provincialisms. Whether we like it or not, whether it is safe or not, the world at large is going to settle the problems of the world at large, and our greatest contribution cannot be by way of repression or of suppressing information, but by way of enlightenment. If, therefore, you have a construc-

tive idea, cast it forth and watch its ripples reach to the ends of the earth. If the world is captured by radical ideas, it will be because the conservative party has offered nothing but criticism, has presented no constructive concepts for the betterment of society. For society cannot stay at any point achieved. Its new problems compel it with the insistency of a boy who outgrows his clothes. If you do not wish for the radicalism of extreme styles and wild sartorial adventure, get busy with the tailor in the interest of something better. It will be of no use to upbraid the boy because he demands a new suit. The only safe society is a growing, progressive society, and the day is already here when wise ideas can run around the earth like wild-fire. If we are wise in our day and generation we shall have a mind to the value of transmitting true ideas to the eager world.

III.

Spiritual Renaissance and a New World

“Profound flashes of insight remain ineffective for centuries, not because they are unknown, but by reason of dominant interests which inhibit reaction to that type of generality.” Thus writes Alfred North Whitehead in *Adventures of Ideas*. These words of Whitehead visualize for us the hope of the present age. Somewhere in history Benedetto Croce has shown how salient concepts have lain fallow and dormant for centuries, waiting for the intellectual and spiritual sympathy of an age capable of appreciating them. Thus it was that Aristotle was lost on his own times and had to wait fifteen centuries for that new understanding that sprang with the Middle Ages. Our great need lies in a wide-spread renewal which shall bring back into general focus long neglected and motivating truths of the human spirit. These truths need not be new

truths in the sense that they have never before been conceived. They cannot be truths which have to do with theological tests of orthodoxy, nor truths of merely academic nature, for they must be so living, so practical, so universal, that to be set forth in the right spirit shall bring them universal recognition. It was something of this kind which must have been in the mind of the great spiritual leader of Nazareth when he announced the advent of the new social and spiritual order should appear "as the lightning cometh forth out of the east and is seen even unto the west."

It may look fatuous to dream of such a possibility in a day which seems so completely addicted to the ways and the sins of the flesh, a day so characterized by the breakdown of idealisms, so overwhelmed by greed and avarice. But the quantum view of history gives hope that we may be near the turning point toward better things. The old assurances of material success are gone. There is no longer a sublime trust that business organization can solve every problem, from social want to spiritual ideals. We have been profoundly shocked to discover what that kind of organization could do when it was not backed by integrity. We have discovered that integrity was not inherent in the vastness of corporate effort. It is found to be something that may be wanting from the counting house and may be absent under an exterior of faultless dress, engaging manners, and social prominence. Our financial house has been wrecked because the old moral traditions that involved integrity and honor had seemed out of date.

TRUTHSEEKERS AND SOOTHSAYERS

By F. C. S. SCHILLER

ANY observant philosopher must often have been struck by the enormous ambiguity of philosophic terms and by the looseness of philosophic terminology. Now at first sight it would seem easy to cure these defects by multiplying the technical terminology of philosophy and defining it exactly. Owing, however, to the habits and customs of philosophers this simple cure seems illusory. For no sooner does one philosopher invent and define a technical term than another comes along and incontinently uses it in another sense, sufficiently like the older one to breed the direst confusion. Philosophy suffers also from an insufficient supply of distinctions. If for example the different senses of words like "experience," "cause," "realism" and "idealism" were distinguished by different names, would not most of the time-honored controversies of philosophy speedily collapse?

The result is that all philosophic terms are allowed to remain obstinately ambiguous, and philosophic debaters are usually content with long distance sniping at cross purposes, and come neither to close quarters nor to any real agreement. I have long been impressed with these evils, which are not only practically inconvenient but morally discreditable and intellectually baffling. But I recognize also that not much can be done, and even that little only with the most meticulous caution and the greatest trepidation. I shall, therefore, be more than satisfied if in this paper I can clear up and clear away one very glaring, but very troublesome, ambiguity.

I.

I mean that between the intellectualist, or absolutist, and the voluntarist, or pragmatist, conception of Truth. They are plainly different and the contrast and the gap between them, as it has been developing for the past thirty years or more, shows no signs of growing less. On the contrary the chasm is widening. The crucial question is whether truth is to be conceived as something characteristically static or as essentially progressive. The believers in absolute truth show no more signs than before of understanding the issues raised by the believers in progressive truth; and the latter are as reluctant as ever to acknowledge the superiority of so-called absolute truth. Pilate's question, therefore, is as good as ever, and as hard to answer.

In the interest, however, of clear thought and honest discussion it seems to me imperative to separate the two senses of "truth" which are concerned in the pragmatic controversy by a sharp and decisive cut. This can only be effected by imposing upon them distinctive names. Only so can both parties know what they are talking about; only so can both parties realize that what they are talking about are quite different things that *can* be distinguished, and ought to be.

II.

There exist indeed a number of the sharpest contrasts between the two conceptions of truth. For the votary of absolute truth, whom for purposes of reference we may call the absolutist, truth is a centre of a number of intense emotional associations. He is vague enough, indeed, about the logical significance of "absolute." It wavers tantalizingly between "not-relative" (in any sense of relative), "final,"

“unquestioned psychologically,” and “metaphysically all-inclusive”; but no logical perplexities are allowed to weaken its emotional appeal. It is one, absolute, immutable, eternal, static, fixed by no human effort, and completely super-human. It is the object of a “disinterested” devotion and a hopeless passion. For though the absolutist is apt to flatter himself that he possesses *some* absolute truth, and is at any rate absolutely certain that no one else has it, he is not always wholly free from twinges of scepticism, especially when he tries to convince others who share his absolutist creed that he is right and they are wrong. For absolute truth, when it is sincerely worshipped, excludes all compromise, and all degrees. It is all or nothing. It is a self-sufficing, self-sustaining and self-proving whole. You either have it wholly or miss it utterly. Moreover, though it may be attainable, it appears to be incommunicable, at least by the ordinary means of communication. The conviction that you have it gets somehow into your head, and you feel it in your bones; though how you can get so intimate with something so divine remains a mystery.

But whatever embarrassments he may be caused by the dissensions and discrepancies of dogmas, the absolutist is staunch in rejecting the alternative attitude toward truth. He simply cannot think of truth as many, as flexible, as relative to a plurality of persons and occasions, as varying with times and seasons, as changing and growing, as corrigible and improvable, as plastic and dynamic, as interesting and serving human interests and purposes, and ministering to human life and human problems. He is merely puzzled, therefore, by the fact that in language “true” admits of a comparative and a superlative, and so, apparently, of less and more. He is even more shocked by the suggestion that to attain it we must *not* aim at totality

but at plurality, not at grasping the scheme of things entire, but at picking out of the vast surge of being some manageable little bit of a problem, on which we can specialize and concentrate attention. The very idea that any truth worth mentioning may issue from a process of successfully selecting objects of human interest, and subjecting them to a number of human manipulations and tests, and valuing them accordingly, seems blasphemous. The very ideal of a total truth to be put together, like the vision of a many-faceted insect eye, out of the separate reflexions of a multitude of special sciences, seems a profanation.

III.

But to the voluntarist all these attitudes required from the scientific truth-seeker involve neither paradox nor difficulty. For in *his* approach the problem of truth arises for him in no sentimental context, but in a perfectly matter-of-fact and business-like sort of a way, as an ordinary incident in his problem-solving activity. "The truth" is merely the solution of a problem, the right answer to an actual and more or less urgent question, the *best* answer he finds himself in a position to give at a given time. There is nothing therefore mysterious, sacrosanct or indefeasible in the answer he accepts. If he could have found, or thought of, a better answer he would gladly have taken that, and in a sense he is always on the look-out for something better than the best he has been able to get. Thus he is never irretrievably committed to his accepted "truth;" he is never committed beyond the point at which it serves the purpose which led to its recognition, and it is always valued in part as a stepping-stone to higher things. His conception of truth, therefore, contains no suggestion of finality, but is *essentially progressive*. It is moreover wholly positive, and

not a veiled negation. It does not confuse logical certainty with psychological. It does not imagine that the road to truth lies through vain attempts to compass the whole; it sees that all our truths are reached by intelligent selection of the partial and the relevant. In short in all its common senses the "absolute" seems a will o' the wisp that leads nowhere and only baffles knowledge.

IV.

Now to distinguish these two diverse and discrepant senses of truth, the English language is in a singularly fortunate position. It is rich in the possession of the two words, "truth" and "sooth"; and in a general way they both mean truth. But they are not complete synonyms, and it would be quite practicable, and easy, to differentiate them further. "Truth" is a familiar, humdrum, and vulgar, term: "sooth" is less hackneyed, more poetic, and much more solemn. Etymologically, "truth" is "what a man *troweth*," and perhaps what he can *trust*. So it seems an apt word to designate the "truth" claimed by the individual judgments which embody a man's opinions, and by which he is willing to abide.

Thus the very derivation of "truth" suggests that it is a matter of opinion, and that opinions need to be tested. Every truth-claim, and in the aggregate the number of such claims may be large and various, needs to be *verified*—that is, literally, made true; and it becomes vitally important to know *how much* verification it has received and may require for our purpose. It cannot ever have received too much, nor so much that no more can conceivably be added to it. So it can never be proclaimed *absolutely* true. The truth it claims, from the very mode of its genesis, must remain relative to the amount of verification it has

received; it must also remain liable to be refuted, modified, extended, or improved by further relevant experience. It cannot be in principle immutable any more than absolute.

Nor can it be eternal, or independent of the time-context which generates it. It is always relative to the state of knowledge at the time when it is enunciated, and it always looks to further confirmation. So it always implies a forward-looking attitude of mind, and a reference to a future in which it may receive further verification, and which may enhance its value.

Nor again can truth be one. It must be relative to times and places and persons and purposes. To ask what is *the* truth is just as absurd a *façon de parler* as asking what is *the* time. We now know that the latter question is unmeaning unless it is further specified where, with what for a standard, and for what purpose, "*the*" time is wanted. We know that all the times of the day, and two days besides, always coexist on the surface of the earth. If we permit our thoughts to stray beyond that privileged sphere, we encounter an infinity of times, and "earlier" and "later" become utterly relative and hopelessly confused. We habitually assume that the biggest and most impressive clock in our neighborhood gives us *the* time. And for our purposes we may be right. For if in crossing the Atlantic we fail to notice that the ship's clock is our measure and is to be put forward three quarters of an hour, we shall be late for breakfast next morning. If we know a little astronomy, we learn that astronomers observe, manipulate and use three or four different sorts of time, and that even before "summer time" was invented and enacted the "standard time" of ordinary life was an artificial product of human conventions and agreements. And the accuracy of time measure-

ment is plainly relative to purpose. For most purposes we no more need to know "the time" to a second than "the distance" to a millimetre.

The case of "truth" is quite analogous. *The* truth in point of fact is always a truth relative to the place where and time when, it is pronounced. It is a truth relative to its asserter and to his listeners, to the purposes of both, to their problems, and to their state of mind. "True" is always *true-for*, just as "good" is *good-for*. The notion that truth can be "absolute" and independent of its occurrence and its use, seems fantastically to ignore every item of its genesis and of its actual function.

V.

The implications of "sooth" seem very different. Etymologically "sooth," though a good old Germanic word like "truth," that did not drop out of vulgar use till the seventeenth century, has some curious associations. In the first place it comes from a root which also means "being," and so exemplifies the distracting confusion of truth and reality which has haunted the topic of truth so persistently. Secondly, "sooth" is connected with "soothe," and so seems very appropriate to designate one of the most important functions of truth. For if, as I mean presently to suggest, we should appropriate the term "sooth" to the loftier, more elevating, and less sordid uses of the general notion, the connection of *sooth* with *soothe* should be extremely welcome. It would serve to indicate the very important sentimental function of absolutist truth as a sort of "paregorical imperative," and would distinguish it very neatly from its humdrum everyday uses.

May I then venture to suggest that the term "truth" should be restricted to these latter, to the scientific and prac-

tical uses, while the more solemn and less banal word "sooth" should be reserved for the more spiritual and metaphysical contexts?

It seems to be imperative, then, to distinguish between Truth and Sooth. To fix this distinction in the mind it may be well to have recourse to the poetic art. Accordingly I have with the aid of kind rhymesters compiled a few easy mnemonic verses:

Let Sooth be Sooth whate'er befall,
The same for each and good for all.
But let Truth be whate'er you trow,
Deem Truth to be that which you know.
Safely to Truth then pledge your troth,
To Truth, not Sooth,—you can't have both.

A good case can be made out also for distinguishing between those who pursue these diverse aims. Let us allocate therefore the terms "truth-seeker" to the pragmatists and "sooth-sayer" to the absolutists, calling the former "truth-seekers," and the latter "sooth-sayers."

VI.

It will, I believe, appear further that this distinction expresses not only a verbal improvement in technical terminology, but a real and profound distinction among philosophic temperaments. Some philosophers are *naturally* truth-seekers; others, as congenitally, sooth-sayers; and philosophy would not be what it is if it did not harbor both.

Truth-seeking and sooth-saying demand, however, very different attitudes of mind, and different equipment. The former requires a keenly analytical mind, quick to see distinctions and to formulate them clearly, together with inexhaustible fecundity in devising hypotheses, endless patience in observing and revising, and unwearying open-

mindfulness and willingness to accept correction from experience. Plainly the truth-seeker leads a hard life, though one not devoid of austere satisfactions.

Sooth-saying, on the other hand, appeals rather to the synoptic eye, that can roam over the whole cosmic landscape, and to the musical ear that can take in the hidden harmony of the spheres. It does not shrink from the abysses and will not fight shy of a great and soul-distending thought merely because it sounds obscure. On the contrary it will take pleasure in developing the oracular side of philosophy.

VII.

Now there is, and always has been, much oracular philosophy; also there are more oracles in philosophy than there are mansions in the skies. Indeed there are so many that it may fairly be suspected that they are really *hermitages*, and that there is really only room for one on every philosophic standpoint. As the Indian sage said: "of masters there are many; the trouble is to find a true disciple."

But this plurality of oracles will not do much harm unless it is incautiously assumed that they are all oracles of the same god, and are engaged in retailing vulgar or scientific truth. If such rash assumptions are made, sooth-saying may indeed prove a disastrous practice, and deserving of interference by the police. But if it is treated merely as a by-product of cognitive activity, it will do but little harm.

I cannot help thinking, however, that something more might be done by professional teachers of philosophy to put the student of philosophy on his guard. He should be warned that there are many gods or demons who infest philosophy and inspire or delude its votaries. There is therefore need for the greatest caution in accepting oracular responses.

For he is not usually in the position of Croesus in the story of Herodotus. He cannot go round to all the oracles and ask them severely testing questions, and then compare their answers. He has not either the riches or the standing of King Croesus. Perhaps the best advice to give him under the circumstances is to bid him be very cautious how he deals with oracles. After all, they ruined also Croesus, despite his critical endeavors. Delphic Apollo trickily gave him the ambiguous response that by crossing the river Halys he would destroy a mighty empire. And it is by no means difficult for a student who accepts an oracle thereby to destroy his mind! He is sure at any rate to get an ambiguous response from his philosophic oracle, and he may not have logic enough to know that ambiguous responses are strictly meaningless!

MARS AND THE MINSTREL

By WALTER SHEA

When Seeger, Brooke, and Kilmer fell,
The vibrant voice of Poetry
Was drowned in the discordant swell
Of wars macabre symphony.

GOETHE: THE POET OF ASPIRATION

By JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM

I.

THE refining fires of criticism which have long been searching Goethe's work and the awarding wreaths of appreciation which crowned his genius in the year of the centenary of his death have left as their united appraisal of his chief virtue—constituting the soul and fiber of his purpose and achievement—aspiration. He is the poet of aspiration; not the only one—but the one in whom—partly perhaps, because there was so much in him also that was low and unworthy—aspiration means most.

Yet aspiration has more aims and forms than one. When we ask: What was Goethe's peculiar form of aspiration, arising within him with his awakening selfhood and continuing in strength to the end of his long life? it may be answered without hesitation, I think, the desire for self-fulfillment. This longing endeavor for self-fulfillment was aspiration, rather than ambition, because it did not aim at anything transient and external but at something inherently high and noble, and became ever purer as life unfolded.

II.

In so far as *Faust* mirrors the experience of its author, the desire for self-realization may be found reflected in this chief product of Goethe's genius. Faust longs intensely for the abundant life and seeks it where at first it seems to lie—in self-indulgence. The baffled student vainly seeking for knowledge, driven by failure and the discovery of human baseness, curses life:

Accurs'd be Hope! Accurs'd be Faith!
And cursed be Patience most of all!

In this mood he is ready to accept the services of Mephistopheles when he knocks at his door (and note that he must say "Come in" three times before the Devil can enter).

To secure this aid he signs the compact in his blood, to deliver his soul to Satan whenever he shall say to the passing moment, "Oh stay, thou art so fair." Under guidance he plunges into the gratification of the senses. After seducing the lovely and innocent Gretchen he is drawn on by Mephistopheles into the excesses and revelings of the *Walpurgis Nacht*, during which he is suddenly brought back to himself as he is dancing with a seductive young witch (from whose mouth a red mouse suddenly to his consternation emerges) by a vision of the deserted and despairing Gretchen, the victim of his passion, languishing in prison for drowning the babe whose coming has proclaimed her guilt. Accompanied by Mephistopheles he goes to her rescue but, crazed by grief and self-condemnation and a growing suspicion of her lover's disloyalty, she refuses to go with him and dies in penitent grief in her cell, calling to her Heavenly Father for mercy — not "judged" as Mephistopheles pronounces her, but "saved" and borne by angels to heaven.

III.

The life of sensuous indulgence having failed to satisfy him, the seeker for the life abundant turns to something higher. The second part of the drama opens with the spent and discomfited Faust, refreshed by long sleep, newly resolved "to seek that highest life" for which he is panting.

Again he sets forth under the tutelage of Mephistopheles, this time to experience the satisfactions of power, then of Beauty in a higher form than before, under the guise of Helena, and at length becomes absorbed in directing the task of draining a pestilent marsh and preparing it for cultivation and human habitation. In this enterprise Faust at last realizes his purpose and as he reflects upon the human homes and happiness which he has thus made possible he speaks the fatal word:

Thus here, by dangers girt, shall glide away
Of childhood, manhood, age, the vigorous day:
And such a throng I fain would see,—
Stand on free soil among a people free!
Then dared I hail the Moment fleeting:
“Ah, still delay—thou art so fair!”
The traces cannot, of mine earthly being,
In æons perish,—they are there!—
In proud fore-feeling of such lofty bliss,
I now enjoy the highest Moment,—this!

Upon uttering these words Faust sinks back—dead. Mephistopheles and his devils prepare to carry him away to hell but angels suddenly appear, pelting and stinging the devils to torture with roses, and bear away Faust’s immortal part—saved at last by aspiration.

At the end, therefore, Evil is frustrated and fulfils its mission in accordance with the description of himself which Mephistopheles gives when on his first appearance he answers Faust’s question, “What art thou, then?” as follows:

Part of that Power not understood,
Which always wills the Bad and always works
the Good.

IV.

Thus is salvation linked to self-fulfillment. *Salvation by aspiration*—this is not so far, surely, from that *salvation by faith* which Germany had learned from Luther and lost in a barren dogmatic formalism, to be recovered (partially at least) by Goethe in this vivid and vital form.

This salvation, according to Goethe, is by no means the achievement of the aspiring soul alone. On the contrary, it involves an act of Divine grace extended to the soul unable to save itself. This note is to be heard in the song of the angels, as they bear aloft the soul of Faust, snatched from Mephistopheles:

The noble spirit now is free,
And saved from evil scheming:
Whoe'er aspires unweariedly
Is not beyond redeeming.

“In these lines,” said Goethe to Eckermann, “the key to Faust’s rescue may be found. In Faust, himself, an ever higher and purer form of activity to the end, and the eternal love coming down to his aid from above. This is entirely in harmony with our religious ideas, according to which we are not alone saved by our own strength, but through the freely-bestowed grace of God.”

“The freely bestowed grace of God.” Here is a word that sounds strangely, coming from the pagan romanticist-classicist who is supposed to have so little of the spirit of Christianity. It shows that Goethe, like Shakespeare, keeping himself open to truth as experience brings it home to the soul, entered at length into the realization of the part which the Divine Mercy has to play in human life.

V.

Aspiration, in Goethe's view of it, is by no means limited in its capacity, or its range. It is not confined to the narrow compass of the present life. It does not cease for Faust with his advent to heaven but continues in the upper spheres, where Gretchen takes the part in conducting him onward which Beatrice performed for Dante. The humble uneducated Gretchen is commissioned to this high task by the *Mater Gloriosa* (the Virgin Mother) who addresses her in these words:

Rise, thou, to higher spheres! Conduct him,
Who, feeling thee, shall follow there!"

This confidence in the continuance of development in the life after death receives striking corroboration not only in Goethe's conversations with Eckermann, but in a letter which he wrote to the Countess von Stolberg, in which occur these words:

I have meant honestly all my life both with myself and others and in all my earthly strivings have ever looked upwards to the Highest. You and yours have done so likewise. Let us continue to work thus while there is daylight for us; for others another sun will shine by which they will work, while for us a brighter Light will glow. And so let us remain untroubled for the future. In our Father's kingdom there are many provinces and as He has given us here so happy a resting-place, so will He certainly care for us above. Perhaps we shall be blessed with what here on earth has been denied us, to know one another merely by seeing one another and because of that, more truly to love one another.

The tone of sincerity and earnestness which marks this statement leaves no doubt as to Goethe's conviction of the eternal worth and immortal range of human aspiration.

VI.

Not only does Goethe recognize the Eternal as the Power that saves the aspiring soul in its extremity, but as the *Source of the aspiration itself*.¹ No lines of his are more universally regarded as replete with profound significance than those of the closing mystic chorus in *Faust*:

Alles Vergängliche
Ist nur ein Gleichnis;
Das Unzulängliche,
Hier wird's Ereignis;
Das Unbeschreibliche,
Hier ist es getan;
Das Ewigweibliche
Zieht uns hinan.

Bayard Taylor's translation of these lines is as follows:

All things transitory
But as symbols are sent:
Earth's insufficiency
Here grows to Event:
The Indescribable,
Here it is done:
The Woman-soul leadeth us
Upward and on.

I venture to offer the following translation:

All that is transient
Is symbol, not soul;
All insufficiency

¹ See the articles "*Goethe's Mind and Art*" and "*Goethe's Faust*" and "*Dante's Divine Comedy*" in *Hibbert Journal* of July, 1932, to which I am largely indebted for suggesting this interpretation of Goethe.

Moves toward the Whole;
The deed, long despaired of,
Yet shall be done:
Love, ever-graciously,
Leadeth us on.¹

What does Goethe's *Das Ewigweibliche* mean? Bayard Taylor (followed by many) interprets it as referring to the Divine Love—the Love that finds its best human symbol in the heart of womanhood.

Whether or not this is carrying the poet's meaning too far, it at least indicates that to Goethe the supremely attractive worth, that which calls out all that is best in the soul, is that union of beauty and goodness, strength and tenderness, of which one catches a glimpse in the noblest womanhood.

VII.

How does Salvation by Aspiration differ from Salvation by Faith? Not greatly, surely. There can be no aspiration without faith, and faith which lacks aspiration can be of but little worth.

In either case an Ideal is the lodestar which draws the soul onward. Salvation by faith, in its pure Pauline form, has for its ideal the divine-human Christ. To be "in him" is to be saved. This is no static salvation, but a constant endeavor to be conformed to his likeness. Thus the true Christ is no stranger to the human soul. He fulfils the Moral Ideal, hidden in the soul of universal man, standing forth incarnated in Jesus.

¹ In these brief but pregnant lines there are encompassed four daring universal affirmations: (1) Symbolic Idealism (Platonism), (2) Progressive Developmentalism (Holism), (3) The Victory of Righteousness (the Kingdom of God), (4) the Leading of Love (Divine Providence). This is poetry, philosophy and religion in fruitful unity.

It is this actualized concreted incarnation of the Ideal in Jesus Christ which gives to Christianity its unique character and its undiminished hold upon humanity, making its appeal where a formless or abstract ideal would fail. 'It was not until near the close of his life that Goethe paid marked tribute to Christ in the words: "I bow before Him as the divine manifestation of the highest principle of morality."' Yet the Christ ideal was undoubtedly wrought more fully than he was conscious of into his whole conception both of manhood and womanhood and had an influence greater than he realized in fashioning his aspiration as it took on an ever higher form.

If we may trust the Gospel representation of the self-consciousness of Jesus it was he more potently than any other, who felt that he had within himself abundant life and had it to give to others. Making all due account of the differences of time and environment it must be said that Goethe's quest of the abundant life led him along a very different road from that of Jesus. Yet it was increasingly a life of service and thus approximated more and more, in spirit though not in consequences, to that of the Master of all good men.

More than one poet who has tried to get away from the Love that would not let him go has gone the circuitous way, yet in returning from the Far Country has received both ring and robe. Goethe's contribution to life and literature, can be fully appreciated only in the light of the aspiration to which he held fast through all his vagrant experiences and the Love that redeemed him and led him on.

It was his unfailing pursuit of self-fulfillment which saved his noble endowments from wreckage and led him to an ever-enlarging self-development and self-dedication.

¹ *Conversations with Eckermann.*

HUNGER: AN EPISODE OF THE RUSSIAN FAMINE

By OLGA KOKSHAROVA

I WAS sitting alone in the room. The day was breaking down; the grayness of the twilight permeated every corner and formed a peculiar shadow on the opposite wall just above the little table. This strange shadow slowly spread along the walls and took a definite shape. At first I could distinguish only the silhouette of a person; but as I looked more intensely, I could clearly see a man. He sat erectly on the table, his pointed chin on his long bony legs; his skeleton arms around his knees, his red swollen fingers, with half eaten nails, moved almost uninterruptedly. The thin blue lips were tightened. The yellow gloomy eyes were looking at one spot. Yet there was a certain mockery in the wrinkles around his mouth and in the movements of his swollen fingers, in his whole form. As I arose, he swung forward, straightened his legs and pressing his head against his knees broke into laughter—the laughter of the insane. Through the sound of this laughter I could distinguish the words, “Bread, just a little piece of bread.”

On the wall above his head, as in a cinematograph, appeared a picture of an old half destroyed convent. The glass of the windows was broken; some of the buildings were without doors; here and there could be seen openings made by bullets. In front of one of the houses stood a group of children. On the door above their heads hung a sign, “The Orphanage.” I saw thin pale faces, blue lips, and little hands covered with boils. The children did not play; they did not laugh. Their thin bodies with drooping shoulders

wore an expression of weariness. Some of them stretching out their bony arms, were asking: "Bread, just a little piece of bread."

The picture changed. An open field was before me. The sky was blue without a cloud; a burning bright sun. The earth was dry; the little stalks of wheat no more than one inch high, were yellow. In the middle of this field a peasant with shaking hands was cutting the wheat. Suddenly dropping on his knees he raised his arms toward the sky, and from somewhere the words of a prayer reached my ears. "God, forgive us—send us rain, our children are starving."

The long row of yellow fields burned by the sun passed before my eyes. A village lay among those fields. I saw a man creeping along the street. A woman stopped him: "Are you going 'Behind the Stack,' Foma?" she asked. "Yes, my turn has come to go today. It is starvation. Andrey, Arina, and David died this morning. Less than half of the village are alive—the rest are dead—that is God's will. Tonight you will put us in the ground; tomorrow some of you will occupy the empty place 'Behind the Stack.' Good-bye, Matrena. I will meet you soon in another world." Slowly he creeps away. Biting her lips Matrena goes with unsteady steps into the house. Again a long row of yellow fields, and then a picture of a town.

The sun was just rising. A wagon covered with a gray tarpaulin was being driven slowly along the empty street. Two policemen walked behind it. They stopped near the porch of a house, picked up from its steps the dead body of a child, put it into the wagon, and slowly moved ahead to stop near another porch. "Every morning is like this," I heard a voice say. "All along the street policemen pick up those who have died during the night. . . . It is Samara! The hungry Samara!"

I saw a station—as an echo. From the corners of the room came the words, “Will the train with bread ever come?” I saw a group of people—skeletons, gray faces, pointed chins, blue trembling lips and gloomy eyes.

And He, the symbol of Hunger, sat erectly on the table, pressing his head against his knees, continued to laugh. Looking at this laughing figure I suddenly realized that I, too, was one of these hungry people—that my lips were blue and my eyes were glassy, that for about five months I had not even seen bread, and that it was almost a week since I had eaten the last blue, oyster-slick potatoes on which I had been living for the last few months. I felt a strange sensation at the corners of my mouth. An involuntary mocking smile contorted my face, a spasm of laughter contracted my throat. Imitating the figure on the table I sat erectly on the floor, put my hands around my legs, my chin on my knees, then I swung forward, stretched my legs, pressed my head to my knees and broke into laughter. A complete darkness surrounded me and seemed to absorb me.

THE INDIVIDUALITY OF THE REAL¹

(Second Posthumous Paper)

By HERBERT WILDON CARR

Personalism and Nature

ACCORDING to naturalism, consciousness is an emergent, a late comer, attaching itself to living matter as an endowment and enriching it with a new quality. Living matter itself is conceived primordially as simple homogeneous space occupancy, an inert matter which in its history as a time succession has acquired heterogeneity through the relative movements of its parts. From the growing complexity of some of these parts it is supposed there has emerged a new stage of activity, life. Consciousness, a later emergent stage, was at one time hardly accorded the status of phenomenon. It was described as an epiphenomenon and denied any insertion whatever into the causal series which for naturalism alone represented the real. Epiphenomenalism still survives in some modern theories, but it has been generally discarded in favor of the view that consciousness marks the emergence of a definite stage or level of cosmic evolution.

According to personalism, consciousness is original, and materiality, instead of being primordial, is the last product of abstraction in the analysis of experience. The concept of matter is inconsistent when we posit matter as origi-

¹ This is the second of a series of posthumous papers, by Herbert Wildon Carr. The first part of this paper, "Personalism and Nature," continues the discussion of the first article, *The Search for Truth*; the second part deals specifically with "The Individuality of the Real."

nal, and the concept of consciousness is inconsistent when we posit consciousness as a derivative from something other than itself. Let us first consider consciousness.

The term consciousness is positive, with unconsciousness as its negative. We use the word unconsciousness to describe the condition of all inanimate objects, and some conditions of living things, but with a very important difference of meaning in the two cases. Thus the new-born babe and the marble statue are unconscious, and the unconsciousness is in each case absolute if we are considering only the complete absence of awareness. The difference is that the unconscious infant is unconscious *in fact* but conscious *in right*; the statue is unconscious *in fact* because it is without consciousness *in right*. While, then, both are unconscious *in fact*, the unconsciousness of the infant is a privation, an absence; the unconsciousness of the statue is a non-existence. The personalist theory is that the nature of consciousness is such that we cannot conceive it arising *in fact* where it did not already exist *in right*. This means that consciousness is not an emergence. In its most immediate meaning of awareness, consciousness is memory and unconsciousness is a forgetting; and just as we only forget what *by right* we can remember, so we are only unconscious of what *by right* we are conscious. But is this a reason for rejecting the idea that inert matter with its absolute absence of consciousness may be original, and life with its accompaniment of memory may be a product of general movement? The answer is quite simple and unambiguous, however contrary to common-sense opinion. The reason is that we only reach the concept of matter by abstraction; and though the concept, when we have formed it, is of a concrete reality, it is from the final stage, not the first stage, of the process that we have made the abstrac-

tion. Materiality is the definiteness which attaches to the deed or act; it is the thing done which cannot be undone. Now, the thing done cannot be more original than the doing. Matter, therefore, for the personalist is in itself literally nothing. It is the deed which has annihilated the doing, the action which is the determination of the act.

Let us now consider matter. It is the concept of pure inertia. The principle *ex nihilo nihil* applies to it absolutely. The naturalist can only overcome this negativity by joining to it simple movement conceived as an external relation. Movement is consistent with pure inertia. It is so expressed in the first law of motion, which declares that a mobile will continue to move, if it is moving, or will continue at rest, if it is at rest, so long as not acted on by an outside force. To this the personalist replies that movement, also, is an abstract concept, abstracted from the experience of activity, and external relations do not change the natures of things. Activity, on the other hand, is the concept of force finding expression. It implies power, unity, or individuality, and purpose or consciousness. Activity may be unconscious, as it is in habit or instinct, but this unconsciousness is suppressed or inhibited consciousness. Wherever an action is being performed or a purpose moving to its accomplishment, consciousness if absent *in fact* is present *in right*.

Philosophy requires us, then, to make a great and continuous effort, an effort to think the real. The history of philosophy from the days of the ancient Greeks to the present time shows that it is no easy task, and if we want an instance close at hand we find it in the development of physical theory in the present century. It is not difficult to see the reason why. Thinking is not a divine gift, it is a natural,

practical form of activity adapted to the purposiveness of life. We are continually discovering that what it is natural to think is not on that account true, if by true we mean representing the real.

I have tried to show that there are two ideals of the best method of attaining the goal in that search for truth in which all philosophers are engaged. To the naturalist philosopher the desired goal is to believe the true and the test of a true belief is its self-evidence in thought and its success in practice. The naturalist starts therefore with an act of faith, the acceptance of the reality presented to him in its objectivity in knowledge, and the task he sets himself is that of interpreting objectively his subjective experience. To the personalist philosopher the search for truth is the continuous effort to think the real, and he thinks the real as it is in himself, not as it seems in an alien object or in an alien world; and, although reality transcends his finite individuality he thinks it as continuous with it, as that in which he lives and moves and has his being.

The Individuality of the Real

1. Common sense beliefs.

There is a general attitude of the individual human being towards the environment in which he thinks and acts which is part of human nature itself. We name it common sense. It is a view of ourselves and the world around us in which we all participate. At first and while still participating in it we are unable to name it for it has no character by which we can distinguish it. Reflection alone enables us to characterize it. Philosophy begins with the questioning of common sense beliefs, and in fact it is not until we doubt our common sense beliefs that we are able to define what those common sense beliefs are.

Common sense is the belief that all knowledge of reality is given by the senses. Ask an ordinary man how he knows the objects of the world around him, he will reply that he sees or hears or tastes or smells or touches as the case may be. Before reflection he is what philosophy has named an empiricist, one who believes that all knowledge is given to the mind by the senses. Also he is what philosophy has named a realist or a materialist, one who believes that the world he knows exists objectively and independently of his mind and consists of the resisting, coloured, shaped objects which he sees and touches. Before reflection no one doubts that the world exists in itself as it is in one's perception of it.

2. The common sense solution of deceptive appearances.

There are difficulties in the common-sense view which are independent of any direct or conscious philosophical reflection. These difficulties, however, easily find a common sense solution and introduce no discrepancy in the natural view of things. First, there are dreams. The ordinary man may be puzzled to explain his dream and may form odd opinions as to its cause and interpretation, but he never confuses it with his waking experience. Whatever superstition may suggest, he easily concludes that the dreamer is not in the dream, but the dream in the dreamer. Dreams he treats as subjective things cut off from the reality with which he is in contact in his waking experience. There are parts also of waking experience which have to be rejected as fiction. Mirages, hallucinations, illusions are representations in the mind with no objective counterpart. They are also deceptive appearances of real things. The stick which appears broken or bent when half immersed in water is identical with the straight stick in the hand, yet the same stick cannot at the same time and in the same

place be both bent and straight. The sun which appears larger at sunset than at noon is not a different sun nor has it undergone alteration. No one ever concludes from these perceptions that there are two sticks or two suns in the real world. We suppose that the discrepancies are accounted for by perspective. This leads to the discovery that all our perceptions of natural objects are determined by perspective and perspective is conditioned not by the object but by the position of the perceiver. We soon find in fact that there is no identity between different perspectives. We believe, therefore, that while we all perceive the same things, each person perceives in his own way. Common sense reconciles all these discrepancies and inconsistencies of subjective apprehension by adopting a view which philosophy names dualism. The ordinary man apart from any intentional philosophical reflection believes that there is a real objective world of inert things which exists in itself in its own way and a subjective world of living conscious beings in whose minds this real world is represented. He resolves all his doubts by recognizing that some part of this representation of the world comes from the subject. Is it not natural to think so? How otherwise can we account for the fact that to the cheerful man the world is pleasing and delightful, to the morose, depressing and fearful, and to the ordinary man sometimes one, sometimes the other? The natural man, however, does not form this dualistic hypothesis as the philosopher forms his hypotheses by logical reasoning, for him it is an instinctive adaptation. Common sense, therefore, is dualistic and it is the dualism of common sense which gives its first subject to philosophical reflection.

3. Philosophical dualism.

Philosophy in the modern period was initiated by Descartes in what he called the new method. This was the

principle of universal doubt. The philosopher in the quest of truth must begin by systematically doubting whatever can be doubted. This Cartesian doubt is theoretical, it has no relation to practical doubt and it is not primarily concerned with religious faith or matters of religious belief.

The first effect of this new method is to confirm the dualism of common sense, and this is followed by the attempt to rationalize it. Doubt must in the first instance be directed to sense knowledge; for though the senses are the source of knowledge yet nothing is more open to doubt than the knowledge which comes to us through them. I can in fact doubt whether anything whatever which I know by sense experience exists, I can even doubt the existence of my own body. There is one thing only I cannot doubt and that is the existence of my mind or rather of the thing I call one, for I know this existence in the very fact that I am doubting. In thinking I know that I am. Doubting, for doubting is thinking, leads me, therefore, to distinguish the mind which doubts from the things of which it doubts the existence. The mind is not itself one of those things. It does not displace or interfere with any of the objects, the ideas of which it possesses. The mind is then simply the thing which thinks and over against it are the things which it thinks about. Descartes accordingly divided reality into two kinds of things, two substances, naming each from its essential quality, the one he called extension, the other thought. This is the first form of philosophical dualism. On the one side is matter. It is essentially an extended thing. It is conceived as filled space, i. e., space with no holes or emptiness in it. In itself it is homogeneous, everywhere alike. Movement when imparted to it cuts it up into distinct and separate objects, first as, when a still pool is agitated, more or less regular rings or vortices are formed

within it, producing variety and diversity. The only objective properties of this extension are its geometrical impenetrability and the forms which are generated by movement. Over against this and distinct from it and having nothing in common with it is mind or thinking substance. Mind can hold all the characters and qualities which matter cannot carry. To this substance belong ideas, feelings, pleasure and pain, and also what are called the secondary qualities of matter and yet are not qualities of matter, colour, sound, heat and cold.

This philosophical dualism commended itself by its clarity. It seemed to give precision to the dualism of common sense, and clearness to the distinction between the mind with its ideas and the world with its objects. In fact, however, it made the problem more difficult. The question was not long in arising: If thought and matter are separate substances, if the soul is quite independent of the body, how are they united? Mind and body are certainly interrelated for each in its way seems to act upon or influence the other.

4. The mind-body problem.

Descartes thought there must be a direct relation between the mind and the body, for the body causes ideas to arise in the mind, and the mind causes movements to take place in the body. His scheme of this relation was very ingenious and though it failed almost from the first to withstand criticism it is so well conceived in its mechanism that it almost seems to anticipate the modern theory of reflex action.

The body, he believed, was animated by a very subtle matter which he named the animal spirits, "animal" being the adjective of *anima*, the living or animating principle. This subtle matter he supposed to be imprisoned in the

large cavities of the brain, named by anatomists the ventricles, from which it could only escape through the nerves, which he thought were very minute tubes with a strong elastic binding leading from the brain to each of the muscles of the body. The movements of the body were caused by the inflation or deflation of the muscles by the animal spirits. The soul must dwell in some part of the body from which it could direct the flow of the animal spirits. He thought he had discovered this seat of the soul in the little body enclosed in the bony base of the skull which anatomists had named the pineal gland. This seemed to him to be the outlet from the brain for the animal spirits and he supposed that in flowing past the soul they caused ideas to arise and that the soul by using these ideas could direct the flow of the spirits.

The difficulty of such a view is obvious at once. It is that by the hypothesis there is not and cannot be any common factor in ideas and movements by which it is possible to imagine the influence of one on the other. Descartes, however, had another theory which gave a certain plausibility to his view that there is a direct relation. He held that the soul is rational and exists only in man. He rejected the theory that there are animal souls and plant souls as the Aristotelians held. He thought all vital processes, even those in man, could be mechanistically explained by the movement of subtle matter. What he had to explain was the subjection of a pure mechanism, the human body, to a quite unique influence, its control by a rational immaterial principle.

The successors of Descartes in the historical philosophical development were Geulincx, Malebranche, Spinoza and Leibniz and in each of these philosophers the mind-body problem is the central point of their speculation.

Geulincx (1625-1669), a Calvinist Professor of Philosophy in the University of Leyden was the first to suggest a theory which later became very influential. It was named Occasionalism. He showed in a masterly demonstration that there can be no direct action of the soul on the body or of the body on the soul. He emphasized this by showing also that the external objects in the physical world cannot be thought to act on the soul and cause its perception. I am, he said, no more than a spectator. My only action is contemplation. Even if external objects cause images on my retina or impressions on my brain, these in themselves cannot be perceptions of an external world. Outside me are objects, within me are ideas, and they have nothing in common. Only one explanation is possible, namely, that I perceive or will by a direct act of God. On occasion of my will God moves my body; on occasion of an affection of my body by an external object God excites an idea in my mind. If God has to be conceived as the author and creator of body and mind, and also as the sustainer of each from moment to moment it is but one logical step further to see that he brings about the union of the two natures by a continual act which is in fact a continual miracle. God who acts by the laws of his own nature ordains that the state of one substance shall be the occasion for producing the state of another.

The theory of occasionalism was more important in what it rejected than in what it affirmed. It led to the general recognition that the idea of a causal relation between physical movements and representative ideas is both irrational in theory and unworkable in practice. The problem remains unsolved in science and philosophy today and occasionalism still survives in the various theories of psychophysical parallelism.

A more notable attempt to overcome the dualism of mind and body was made by Malebranche (1638-1715). God, in his view, must be conceived as the absolute substance containing all things in himself and viewing all things in their true nature. God is the place of spirits. God is the entire world in so far as that world is intellectual or ideal. It is by reason of our ideal or spiritual nature that we are in union with God and by reason of this union we have knowledge of external things. Our knowledge consists of ideas and these we see in God. This was the theory, very famous in its time, of Vision in God.

Spinoza (1632-1677) treated the union of mind and body from a new standpoint in accordance with the principle of one substance, the infinite and eternal all-inclusive existence we name God. Finite creatures are modes of this infinite substance; they come from God, they return to God. Their determination which gives them their individuality is not a positive quality but a negation. From this new principle arose a new idea of the nature of the union of mind and body. Instead of separate substances, mind and body are modes of two attributes of the divine substance, the attributes of thought and extension. All reality has this twofold aspect, it is actual and it is ideal. Every existence has a nature or essence. The union of mind and body is not the binding together of two separate things, it is the dual aspect of the same thing. The mind is the *idea* of the body, the body the *ideatum* of the mind. Each order is distinct in its kind. There may seem to be ideas with no *ideata* in the extended world, but this is because an idea may be the *ideatum* of an idea, that is, we may have the idea of an idea of an idea and so *ad infinitum*. The mind-body union accordingly is a psychophysical parallelism, there is no causal connection and no interaction, but instead

of the parallelism of two independent causal series, there is the parallelism of two aspects of a unique mode of existence, each mode being a mode of the one infinite substance.

Spinoza's theory is a great advance in rationalization. It overcomes the dualism of Descartes and yet can explain the dual nature of man. Existence itself has the double aspect of an order and connection of things and an order and connection of ideas. There is no interaction between mind and body just as there is no interaction between a triangle and the idea of a triangle. The beauty of Spinoza's conception is that it is not only an advance in rationalization, but also a purely naturalistic interpretation, free from the artificiality which characterizes the more modern forms of psycho-physical parallelism.

Leibniz (1646-1716) interpreted the mind-body union on an entirely different principle. Like Spinoza he rejected the dualism of two separate substances, but he did so by a criticism of the concept of substance which involved the rejection of material substance. Substance is essentially activity and activity exists only in individual agents. Matter is a phenomenon of confused perception. Neither matter nor space and time have any reality independent of the perceptions of real agents. Space is the order of co-existence, time the order of succession in the perceptions of active individuals. The universe is one but it is composite and its constituents are minds or spirits. The mind-body union was interpreted in accordance with this new principle. The body is not a material substance if by matter is meant an inert, non-living substratum. In other words, the body is not animated stuff, it is an organized conglomeration of living units. Each unit is individual, moved by an inward principle, acting according to a law of its own nature, developing its activity for its own in-

dividual ends. Each individual unit which composes the body organism is itself a mind-body union. The mind is not separate from the body though it is distinct from it. The body is a many, the mind is one, an entelechy. Entelechy is the principle of integration, the principle by which the many can be one in act. Leibniz named the unit individuals monads and defined them as the simple substances of which the universe is composed. His system is the metaphysical basis of personalism as distinct from naturalism. To understand the mind-body union we must apprehend it in its working or process. It is essentially a concept of activity and no static image can represent it adequately. The mind is the dominant monad existing in and not apart from the individual monads of the body which are subservient to it. The mind is not a thing but an entelechy, that is, an individual activity which directs the manifold individual activities of the body to a single end which is the end of the individual entelechy and not the end of the constituent activities. This organization of the individual activities, the work of the mind or dominant monad, is not brought about by interaction or by mechanical means of any kind. It is purely ideal. It is a harmony. Such is Leibniz's theory of the mind-body relation.

Leibniz could not discover or even imagine any natural means by which such a harmony could have been brought about, and in common with all the leading philosophers of his age he had recourse to the concept of God. His theory was described by himself as his new system of the pre-established harmony. God, the Supreme Monad, the infinitely perfect being of the ontological argument, created the free individual natures which constitute the universe. His omniscience enabled him to know the free actions which would flow from the nature of each individual and his omni-

potence enabled him to give existence to the world of free natures which would allow the greatest possible activity and the completest harmony.

Although Leibniz's thought is cast in the theological moulds of the seventeenth century, it is quite easy to reconcile it with the scientific conceptions of our own time. If we take, for example, the modern concept of evolution, whether we interpret it by the principle of natural selection or by the principle of creation, in either case we have to conceive the process as integral and the resultant of the process as harmony. New species appear as an adaptation and never as the consequence of mechanical causation.

5. Monism and pluralism.

A comparison of the two systems, Spinoza's and Leibniz's, discloses the metaphysical ground of the opposite principles, naturalism and personalism. Allowing for the *odium theologicum*, the bane of all controversy in the seventeenth century, and confining ourselves to the pure rationalism of the two philosophers, we see in the opposite principles adopted by Spinoza and Leibniz the logical alternatives for the conception of the metaphysical basis of physical reality. We may call them the monistic and the pluralistic alternatives. Further, we may reduce the problem to a single comparatively simple issue, the status of matter. The mind is spiritual, the body is material. What is the nature of that matter which constitutes in the body corporeality?

In Spinoza's system corporeality has its ground in the divine substance equally with ideality as infinite attributes. The mind is not a quality of the body and the body is not the substance of the mind, but the human being, mind-body, is a finite mode of the infinite substance. God is infinite but

infinity includes and does not exclude the finite. That is to say, the finite does not exist side by side with the infinite, the imperfect side by side with the perfect, finitude and imperfection in themselves are privations or negations. The human mind thinks and wills and acts through the living body, but life, understanding and will which appear as the perfection of human nature are imperfections which do not exist in God. Human free will is illusion. God is free because God is unconditioned existence, but in God are no unfulfilled desires and for him there exist no external restraints, so that there is no analogy between the divine and the human freedom. What then is the human mind? It is a finite mode of an infinite substance. If now we modernize this principle and divest it of the theological wrapping, expressing it in ordinary scientific form, the God of Spinoza becomes precisely what we mean by nature. It then expresses the comprehensive unity, the oneness in genesis and destiny, of all forms of existence, real and ideal, material and spiritual. The principle of naturalism is that the infinite variety of the universe together with its systematic order is not the work of any transcendent activity or power, designing ends and creating means. Though the diversity of the universe is endless there is no real change. Whatever exists in the spatio-temporal order has its ground in nature which is infinite and eternal. We conceive nature primarily in its spatial aspect as matter or inertia, then in its temporal aspect as a succession of causally determined events, but under whatever aspect it appears, we refer the appearance to what is immanent in nature not to a creative force behind it, our own or another's. Nature exists in itself indifferent to our thoughts about it, which thoughts like everything which is, depend on it and derive from it. This is the monistic principle.

Let us now consider the pluralistic principle, first as it appears in Leibniz and then as the basis of personalism. Leibniz conceives substance as force, and force is not actuality but potentiality. The materiality of anything is its actuality at any and every particular moment. There is, therefore, no material substance and the very phrase is always treated by Leibniz as a contradiction in terms. Matter is inert, force is active. Substance is essentially active and activity is necessarily individual. The real universe, accordingly, is not a world of inert matter activated by external mechanical laws; it is a harmony of individual living active forces. This harmony, Leibniz held, could not be accounted for by natural means, it could only be brought about by the power of the omniscient creator, who must have pre-established it. We have the type of this harmony in the union of mind and body. The body considered at any moment as corporeal mass is inert matter, divisible to infinity and subject to the laws of movement which hold throughout the physical world. In its substantiality, however, it is not material, either as a composite whole or in its constituent parts, it consists of living individual forces, each self-centered, each with its own outlook, expressing in its activity its own nature, and all these individual forces working together in harmony, in such way that the mind or entelechy is also one and individual.

From our modern standpoint the point of departure of the pluralistic principle is that it rejects the type of unity offered by the material world and seeks it in the living world. It starts from the reflective consciousness of the subject in the actual activity of thinking. I think, therefore, I am. In our conscious activity we have direct experience of real unity, of an individual, of a real existence which cannot be divided or separated into parts. We have ideas

of spatial objects, but our mind is not spatial and our ideas are not spatial. We cannot separate our mind from its ideas, feelings, emotions, desires and wishes. All these are owned; they are not loose entities roaming about the universe until captured by some mind. We may submit the mind to analysis and discover distinctions without limit, but the distinctions are not dissections. When we analyse the mind we may employ a spatial scheme, but the distinctions are not spatial distinctions. Also we may employ a temporal scheme and regard the mind as a history with chronological stages, but the mind is not itself a succession of states, it is integral and identical in all its states.

Personalism is based on this pluralistic principle. It is, therefore, an idealism of the Platonic type. The universe is not simple but composite, the component reals are spiritual not material units, their relations are internal and ideal, and their union is a harmony of individual ends.

6. The personality of God.

If we conceive a Supreme Being on this principle, we must conceive him as a person. It is necessary to point out, however, that the pluralistic principle does not affirm or necessitate the affirmation of the existence of a Supreme Being, it does not, like the monistic principle, depend upon such existence. The difference of the two principles is that while for the monist, the *ens realissimum*, whether conceived as the *materia prima* of materialism, or as the absolute of idealism, is in its very conception impersonal, without understanding or will; for the pluralist on the other hand God is perfect omniscience and absolute good will. If, as Leibniz said, the concept of a perfect being in this meaning is possible, then such a being exists. But, we must ask, is the idea of a being perfect in understanding

and will really free from self-contradiction? Leibniz exercised much ingenuity in the demonstration that it is, but certainly he cannot be said to have convinced the modern world. The Supreme Monad is a necessary being in Leibniz's system because there must be a creator of the finite monads and an establisher of their harmony. Impressed with the vision of a moral world arising from the natural world by natural means, a system in which, by means of nature we rise to Grace, he conceived God as "*le plus parfait des Monarques*," and following St. Augustine, he described the City of God as, "*cette monarchie véritable universelle, un monde moral dans le monde naturel, ce qu'il y a de plus élevé et de plus divin dans les ouvrages de Dieu*." The difficulty of modernizing such a conception is that the pluralistic principle does not lend itself easily to a creation theory, and yet only if the Supreme Monad is the creator of the finite monads is it possible to rationalize the attributes of omniscience and omnipotence required for the pre-established harmony. What Leibniz's principle really indicates is the conception of God as the world-soul. This was pointed out with great force by Dr. William Clarke in the controversial correspondence between him and Leibniz, in the last year of Leibniz's life, but vehemently resisted by him. The conception of God as the world-soul would indeed have rationalized his philosophy, but at the cost to his system of the pre-established harmony.

It is important to remember, however, that the conception of God which has been the directing influence in Western thought, is not the monotheistic concept of the Hebrew, but the trinitarian concept of the Christian. The doctrine of the eternal procession of the three persons in the God-head lends itself easily to rationalization by the pluralistic principle. The philosophical implications of this conception

have appealed to many leaders of philosophy in the modern period, and in particular to Hegel. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity is associated in our minds with the anathematizing language of the creeds and with the inconsistent dogmatic formulations which have resulted from the passionate controversies of the theologians, and we are apt to forget that it is purely philosophical in its origin, the direct outcome of the dialectical genius of the Greeks. Its high philosophical value is the proof it offers that the real is a system. The unity of the universe is not the unity of a series, but the unity of an organism. There is neither a first nor a last term. The "I am" of the supreme being like the "I am" of the finite being is the affirmation of identity in difference. A rational theory of creation requires that the Word or Logos or Reason which proceeds from God should be God.

It is important also to note that in following the trinitarian conception of God we free ourselves from the difficulty of finding a place for an infinite being side by side with the existence of finite beings and in external relation to them. Instead, God represents the principle of reality itself, the principle of original activity and eternal process. The principle of pure inactive substance, pure being, leaves becoming a mystery. Creation on such a principle is irrational because it is simply inconceivable. If, instead, we conceive God as the living God, the eternal life principle itself, then the trinity of Father, Son and Holy Ghost makes explicit the actual moments in the concept of activity—the power, the act, the deed. If the concept is of conscious activity, then the moments are—the purpose, the act, the event.

The conception of reality as a system is common to naturalism and to personalism. The difference between

them is in their interpretative principle. For the one it lies in the real relations which are presented in the mechanical actions and reactions of the constituents of the objective world of nature. For the other it is to be found alone in the ideal relations by which spiritual individual units, persons, are compounded.

SHEPHERDS OF SWITZERLAND

By TESSA SWEAZY WEBB

In Switzerland, when evening shadows fall
 Upon the crest of Lower Engadine,
 The shepherds lead their flocks from fields of green
Stilled peace, back to the village. Here the call
Of human voices is endemical.
 Here are men's chiseled dreams woven between
 Beleaguered whims, and sepulcher of clean
Immortal rights, the aged-old miracle.

And here the ancient Chateau of Tarasp,
 With stately peace, is mounted on high rocks;
And as the shepherds pass they pause to grasp
 The elemental comfort of their flocks.
They, too, some day must heed a Shepherd's hand,
When God leads them away from Switzerland.

IDEAL-REALISM

(PART TWO)

By N. LOSSKY

Concrete ideal-realism affirms the existence of a reality which stands above spatial and temporal processes as well as above ideas. Ideas are always subordinate aspects of this higher reality as its qualities, properties, faculties, possibilities or forms of activity. The primacy of concretely-ideal being finds expression in the fact that its content cannot be exhausted by any number of abstract characteristics: however many forms, qualities, properties we may discover in it, it will always be something over and above them, and, what is more, it will always be a whole which is more than its combined elements and never a *sum* of them. Every definite capacity, every form, in fact, every abstract idea has a strictly limited content, while a concretely ideal entity, being the source of its forms and qualities or at any rate being an agent which makes them its own, transcends the limitations of forms and qualities. It transcends its qualities but it has the power to develop those qualities. In that sense it is unlimited, unbounded and therefore can never become dead: its power of creating new ways of being and also new manifestations in time and space is inexhaustible. This is why it is the principle of life; as an independent source of life it is a living being, substantial agent.

Since it transcends all definite characteristics such a being cannot be compared to any other being by the method of comparison based upon the recognition of determinations which are conditioned by the logical (and ontological) laws of identity, contradiction and excluded middle, and are applicable to abstract ideas and real events only.⁶

⁶See N. Lossky *Handbuch der Logik*, Ch. IV, *The World as an organic whole* (Clarendon Press) and S. Frank's *Predmet Znania*.

Hence, the concretely-ideal selfhood of such a being is *metalogical*; it is a unique whole, incomparable to anything else—an individual; all its manifestations bear the mark of an individual character, since the individual is present in them all, imparting to them its own unique and indescribable flavor. We generally use the plural in speaking of individuals; yet if one thinks of the boundlessness of an individual being, it seems as though there could not be many individuals but only one. This difficulty is insoluble for abstract reason and can only be overcome if we remember that the individual belongs to the realm of *metalogical* being to which the conception of number does not apply. That which is individual does not lend itself to counting (we find a vague suggestion of this when parents, asked how many children they have, answer “Peter, John and Mary” instead of giving the number “three”). In the *metalogical* realm individuals are neither one nor many in the arithmetical sense, for what Plotinus says of the intelligible world is entirely applicable to it:

every part is born from the whole and is simultaneously the whole and a part; wherever is a part, the whole reveals itself. The fabled Lynceus, whose glance penetrated to the very bowels of the earth, is only the symbol of the celestial world.

In view of the complete interpenetration of all entities in that realm of being, the conception of plurality can only be applied to it in a qualitative⁷ and not a quantitative sense.

Many philosophers have come to the conclusion that such a realm of being exists, but few have attained a comprehensive vision of it. Leaving aside mystical and artistic representations, a strictly philosophical account of it is to be found chiefly in Plotinus, Hegel, and V. Solovyov.

⁷See Bergson's *Time and Free Will*.

A special kind of knowledge is required to grasp this concretely-ideal realm of being; it is distinct both from the sensuous intuition (i.e. the apprehension of colours, sounds, etc.) and from the intellectual intuition of reason by means of which we contemplate the abstract ideal realm (mathematical ideas etc.)—it is the concretely-intellectual intuition Hegel calls it concrete speculation; V. Solovyov calls it faith or mystical knowledge, saying that the knowledge of concretely-ideal being, or of what “truly is”, differs profoundly both from empirical knowledge (sensation) and from rational knowledge (thought). I will designate the knowledge of these realities by the term “mystical intuition” in contradistinction to the sensuous and the intellectual intuition.

Nevertheless, analytical knowledge about concretely-ideal entities, about substantival agents, is possible, because every one of them is inseparably connected both with the abstract-ideal and with the real being. Our knowledge of these connections, and contemplation of the harmony between the concretely-ideal entities, gives us a right to say that we may not only be conscious of those entities but actually cognize them.

As an instance of a concretely-ideal entity that unquestionably exists and is familiar to all of us we may take the human self considered as a substance. Suppose, e.g. a young man, keenly interested in the history of art, is longing to go to Italy and study the great works of art in their native land; before going there, he prepares himself for his task by studying at home the history of Italian poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture and music, developing in himself a number of faculties necessary for the thorough understanding of what he is going to see. He is conscious of his desires,

plans, feelings and activities as they find realisation here and now, but his being is not limited to this definite range of experiences. Over and above all this limited real existence there is his self-hood. The deeper understanding of life acquired through art may bring him to religion; he will long to work in that sphere, will condemn many of his former characteristics, desire new activities and actually develop new faculties for carrying them out. The self transcends not merely its actual manifestations but its own faculties too. It is the *potentiality* of all these limited, finite contents, not as an abstract idea but as a creative source, a living, real potentiality, a creating force, or, more exactly, the bearer of forces, the substantival agent.

These characteristics of the substantival agent make one think of the *Absolute*. The human self has indeed been created "in the image and likeness of God" but of course it is not the *Absolute*. It has an element of non-being, hence it needs *activity in time*, perpetually enriching its content; but the *Absolute* does not need anything and enters the stream of time for its own sake.

Those who recognize the existence of concrete ideal entities such as the human ego do not reduce causation merely to the *order* of events in time. A new event cannot be caused by a preceding event with a definite, limited content; taken in the abstract, it is devoid of all dynamic character, is incapable of further development and can only sink irretrievably into the past. Forward movement, further development of an event is only possible in so far as that event depends upon an agent or a substance whose state it is, and who strives to cancel, transform or complete it. Thus, the essentially *causal* element in the succession of temporal processes is always some concretely ideal entity. Being super-

temporal it embraces both the present state and the next one, generated by it on the ground of the preceding, so that the end of the preceding event may be the beginning of the following one. The causal series of time is not an addition of *b* to *a* but a continuous flux, a transformation of what had gone before into something new, e.g. the continuation of movement, the growth of a feeling, its change into decision, etc. This continuity cannot possibly be the result of a synthesis of the understanding or of any combination of abstract ideas: there can be no synthesis where the whole is continuous. Abstract idealism cannot explain the continuity of the causal series.

If a supertemporal substance stands above, the temporal causal series of events, creatively giving rise to them, it cannot be subject to the established course of events but can break their continuity; the unity of the series would, however, be preserved in so far as both the past and the present would be held together by one and the same super-temporal substance. Such breaches of continuity must be recognized if there is such a thing as freedom. They take place when the substantival agent condemns its past, repents of it, and renouncing it completely, rejects not only the actions it has condemned but his own character that had conditioned those actions. The result is a profound change in the personality. Such a high degree of creative power is only possible for a concretely-ideal entity and is a necessary condition of true freedom: indeed, what we find in a case like that is not merely freedom from one's past but freedom from those limitations of one's individuality that Kant designated by the term "empirical character."

The fact that a concretely-ideal entity participates in a causal process finds an empirical expression in the striv-

ing, effort, activity; this active aspect of causality proves that it is not a lifeless order of succession but a process of creation or generation. Abstract ideal forms and contents of the temporal process (i.e. of the event) cannot give rise to that aspect of causality.

The erroneous idea that one event may create another apart from any substantival agent arises as follows: an event is so intimately connected with a substance and so inseparable from it even in thought, that when we try to form a notion of a *pure event* without any substance or force, we unconsciously read into it all that a substantival agent implies and thus obtain the desired result—the movement forward. The error can be easily detected in cases where abstraction is easy, for if the process of abstraction be really carried out to the end, the passive nature of the temporal process as such becomes obvious. Let us take for instance a moving body and think of its movement merely as a series of positions in space; this will certainly not explain the necessity for further movement, for the *continuation* of the series. A series thus conceived is merely an order and may be regarded as the result of a synthesis of the understanding. The case will be different if we detect in the last position of the observed body the presence of force, as a manifestation of the body possessed of a certain mass and velocity: then we shall at once be compelled to think of a new process arising on the basis of the preceding one. This, clearly, is living being, substantival agent and not a synthesis of the understanding.

The organic character of concrete ideal-realism as pre-eminently the philosophy of living reality is seen still more clearly in its doctrine of purpose and of life in the biological sense of the term. It maintains that an organism has

for its basis a substantival agent who subordinates to himself all the other substantival elements of the organism; being superspatial it transcends space and is immediately related to all the organs of its body at once—the eye, the heart, the muscles of the leg, etc.—however far they might be from one another in space. The immediacy of the relation consists in the fact that this “central” substantival agent immediately influences all the organs of the body, and immediately (intuitively) apprehends all their changes and states as a single whole. Experiencing it thus as a whole, the central agent regulates the activity of all its organs from the point of view of the whole, harmoniously coordinating them. Thanks to this single entity the organs of the body cease to be extraneous to one another and become in a sense immanent in one another and therefore capable of simultaneous interdetermination.

Owing to this close union all that takes place in one organ exists not only in and for it but also for other organs. All the organs are both the means and the end for one another. Such a whole, having one life, is animated, and the central substantival agent that creates this unity may be called its *soul*, or, in the case of the lower forms of life, its *psychoid*. It would be more correct, however, to speak of the substantival agent as a meta-psychophysical⁸ entity, for it is the source both of psychical and of physical processes (of attraction and repulsion) and transcends, therefore, the division into soul and body.

Organic unity brought about by a concretely ideal entity overcomes both spatial and temporal externality—and this accounts for the peculiar nature of the *causa finalis*. The supertemporal agent transcends time and consequently, can

⁸The term used by W. Stern in his work “*Person und Sache*.”

be directly related not only to the present but also to the past and the future. Just as the different organs of the body cease to be external to one another owing to the agent's superspatial character, so the different temporal processes, owing to the agent's supertemporal character, become correlated and interpenetrate one another. This *wholeness* of the temporal process finds expression in the fact that a present event happens under the influence of the past experience for the sake of the future, as a means of its realization; thus the future helps to condition the present.

Abstract ideal principles such as the forms of orderly sequence are also necessary for the teleological structure of reality, but they are not sufficient to bring it about. The agent who builds up the purposive unity of many elements in time and space must be either the creative source of those elements, or, if they be given to him (e.g. food for building up his body or memory images as matter for artistic creation) he must actively attend to them, make a selection, etc.; but there is nothing creative or dynamic about abstract ideas. Besides, all abstract ideal principles having a strictly limited and determinate qualitative content can condition only an abstractively-purposive structure, fit for carrying out only some one definite activity performed invariably in the same way. Such is the purposive character of a machine built by an engineer according to a rational plan and capable of carrying out one, two or three uniform functions corresponding to its abstract and limited purpose. In the case of a machine organization means merely a purposive correlation between its main parts—wheels, levers, screws, etc., but the parts of those parts and all the rest of the machine have no purposive structure; this is why, in its numberless encounters with its environment a machine acts like

a lifeless aggregate that can do nothing but wear out, i.e. fall to pieces. An organism is something very different—it is organized through and through: not only are the organs purposively correlated to one another and to environment but also the cells composing those organs, the molecules of the cells and so on.

Such a system which is organized throughout and is infinitely rich in content implies concrete purposiveness and concrete organization, and, consequently, it must be based upon a concretely ideal principle and not upon an abstract idea. The presence of such a principle is proved both by the infinite thoroughness of the organic structure and by the infinite multiplicity of its purposive functions (e.g. activities of self-preservation). W. Stern in his book *Person und Sache* draws attention to the differences in this respect between a mechanical aggregate and a living entity. Mechanical aggregates also afford instances of conservation and readjustment writes Stern; thus, a lake may retain approximately the same water-level in spite of evaporation and increase through rainfall and tributary rivers; a rubber ball as soon as the pressure is removed assumes its round shape once more. But there is an essential difference between these phenomena and the self-preservation of an organism. A mechanical aggregate is capable of rectifying only one, two or three definite deviations from the normal, and the readjustment is carried out each time in the same way. An organism behaves differently: if the deviation from the norm has not gone beyond a certain limit, the process of recuperation (e.g. the taking of food, the healing of a wound, the maintenance of temperature, etc.) is carried out in a number of ways and often with marvelous ingenuity. This is only explicable if the regulating, harmonizing principle that lies at the basis of an organism be a con-

cretely-ideal principle. An abstract idea can be the explanation of uniformity but not of creative inventiveness.

The opponents of my views may object as follows: the teaching, that events of human life are manifestations of the human ego, as of a substantival agent simply superposes upon human life a repetition of the same human being as a whole, a second specimen of it, as the cause of the first, and that, consequently, this teaching explains nothing and introduces an entirely futile concept.

I reply to this, by drawing the attention of my opponents to the following differences between the substantival agent and its manifestations: the manifestations of the agent have a temporal or spatio-temporal form, whereas the agent as such is super-temporal and super-spatial. Its manifestations have no active force, the agent is a bearer of a creative force. I shall elucidate the productiveness of this concept by the following example: Present-day physicists are saying that the electrons change the orbit of their rotation without flying across the space which separates one orbit from another. How shall we understand this? Of course, this phenomenon can be understood only if we recognize that the electron is a super-spatial substantival agent and only its manifestations, namely, repulsion and attraction, are adapted to a definite point in space. If that is the case, then it is clear that a super-spatial agent can discontinue its own acts of repulsion and attraction, in one point of space and initiate them in another point, and that, furthermore, nothing is flying from one point to the other.

All the characteristics of abstract ideal-realism indicate that it can provide no explanation of living reality: all it can discover in the world are causal connections, conformity to law, uniform order admitting of no freedom or crea-

tive activity. Concrete ideal-realism, on the contrary, is the philosophy of living being: it teaches us intuitively to contemplate concretely-ideal principles and by doing so to apprehend the purposive nature of being, of freedom, of life and creative activity.⁹

⁹See N. Lossky, *The World as an organic whole* (Clarendon Press 1928); *La matiere, l'intuition et la vie* (F. Allan 1928); *Freedom of Will*, Williams and Norgate, 1932.

THROUGH SCIENCE TO GOD

By THOMAS CURTIS CLARK

Orphaned I stand, about me blazing suns;
 Age unto age, the heartless cosmos runs.
 Deluged with day, I weary of the light;
 Some shadowed place I seek to ease my sight.
 My bark is lost upon the trackless sea;
 Too great the glory, 'tis too vast for me.

Yet is my life of this vast world a part—
 Part of the world of which He is the Heart;
 Into my lungs He breathes His vital breath,
 While He shall live, my soul shall know not death.
 Once was I lost, a brother to the clay;
 Now, child of stars, I face eternal day!

CURRENT THOUGHT

"The Refutation of Realism"

A THIRD of a century should be a long enough time in which to forget a "Refutation of Idealism" which even its author has admitted did not achieve its purpose. And for those who still remember the refutations which this refutation by Professor G. E. Moore naturally provoked, it should appear as a monument to the fruitlessness of such gestures. After three decades, however, the Editor of *Mind* has presumably thought it safe to permit a counter-refutation; so he has printed in the April Number "The Refutation of Realism" by Professor W. T. Stace.

The realistic position which Professor Stace endeavors to refute is that "some entities sometimes exist without being experienced by any finite mind." Thus his attack includes not only realism but many idealisms, such as Berkeley's, which have postulated a non-finite entity in order to make finite experience intelligible.

At the outset Professor Stace makes two significant admissions: (1) that there is no way of proving that physical entities do not exist unexperienced, and (2) that some of the entities which we experience may be distinguished as "physical" or "non-mental." He then proposes to prove what we consider to be two distinct contentions: (1) "That there is absolutely no reason for asserting that non-mental, or physical, entities ever exist except when they are being experienced," and (2) that "the proposition that they do exist is utterly groundless and gratuitous, and one which ought not to be believed."

Professor Stace's proof proceeds from an analysis of inductive and deductive inference. Clearly we cannot experience in sense perception that which by hypothesis is unexperienced. Hence, he argues, we can only validly induct that all experienced physical entities appear as objects of experience; and from this we can only validly deduce that some physical entities are not unexperienced; clearly, we cannot validly infer from these propositions that some physical entities are unexperienced.

One must admit that this is at least a plausible proof "that no proof of the existence of unexperienced objects is possible," just as it is equally true and admitted that no proof of the non-existence of unexperienced physical entities is possible. But Professor Stace has dodged the issues with which he proposed

to deal. For he set out to show that the belief in unexperienced entities is (1) unreasonable and (2) groundless; but in his proof he merely demonstrates that valid inference furnishes no proof that will demonstrate the belief.

If this is a "refutation of realism" it involves also a refutation of idealism and indeed a refutation of all scientific proof. For the essence of the experimental method, to mention one example, is the assertion of the reasonableness of arguing from a few observed cases to laws covering vast masses of unobserved (and doubtful) cases. Professor Stace himself declares that "Inductive reasoning proceeds always upon the basis that what has been found in certain observed cases to be true will also be true in unobserved cases." From this we should conclude that it is reasonable to believe in the probable existence of unobserved entities on the basis of observed ones; and that it is also reasonable to argue from the physical character of some observed or experienced entities to the physical character of some unobserved or unexperienced entities. For there is admittedly nothing which makes such entities impossible. Similarly we may proceed from the experienced character of all observed experiences to the experienced character of all unobserved experiences. Even though the latter two inferences cannot apparently both be true, may they not be reasonably entertained together as probable hypotheses forming a basis for reasonable beliefs.

One wonders why in his refutation of realism Professor Stace does not demonstrate the unreasonableness of probable beliefs. For at this stage of the argument both realism and idealism would seem to be about equally probable: and neither is so far unreasonable. But instead of going into the probabilities of the question, he calls on us to reject realism as groundless in the same way that we reject "the belief that there is a unicorn on Mars." The fact that there is no valid demonstration of this belief does not make it necessarily a groundless one. It is equally undemonstrable that there are no unicorns on Mars, yet I suspect that Professor Stace and many others believe their absence to be a probable truth, and not without any reason. But just as this view may be supported with reasons, so there are many reasons why the existence of Martian unicorns is probable, even though the degree of probability may be very low. The fact that they exist on earth in the Royal Arms of Britain suggests that by analogy that they may also exist on Mars, though there are also other conflicting analogies which may be considered even more probable. At any rate, the unobserved existence of the other side of the moon, to take another of Stace's examples, is highly probable, as is attested by

the mature opinions of many astronomers. But if there is any reasonable basis for such a belief, it is hardly reasonable for Professor Stace to call on human beings to give up their commonplace belief in the unexperienced existence of physical things merely because it has been demonstrated that "no proof of the existence of unexperienced objects is possible."

H. Jeffery Smith.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

Sea Wind

HOWEVER tedious the tossings of fitful slumber, there comes an hour before the gray of dawn, known to all dwellers near the ocean, when a sudden stir and vitality in the air comes like a draft of refreshing to a desert traveller. It is the message of the sea-wind so distinct from the atmosphere that has surrounded us as to seem from another world. Not alone is it the marine tang of the air that marks the end of stifling discomfort, but the whole group of associations with which it is redolent. The salt breeze speaks of the freedom of flying sea gulls; of waters scudding past the bows of tossing ships; of the far reaches of ocean waste; of bellying sails; of the wild grandeur of ocean sunsets and crimson and jade colored seas; of upper air washed clean with sun and wind; of the deep-off-sounding breakers upon the reefs; of tossing arms of spume along the headlands reaching out like mermaids for the hapless mariner; of adventure, peril, and tragedy, of storm and shipwreck.

No wonder that the sea becomes the symbol of our mortal scene, nor that its breath is to the fever-tossed like the breath of life. Its message is akin to that which floats to discerning hearts from the higher realms of the spirit, deep with thoughts, aspirations, worships and longings of men of other days.

Our echoes roll from soul to soul
And go forever and forever.

There come moods of the soul, hours of barrenness and sense of futility, into which as by the miracle of sea-wind come some waftings from the world of the spirit which bring the refreshing of new life. We suddenly achieve to new outlooks, ways that were hedged about become plain, confusion turns to understanding, and

blindness to insight. No matter how wearisome the journeying, we are filled with strength and hope for another mile: instead of the mood of surrender we feel that the battle is only beginning: we are buoyed even with the deeper confidence of Channing *Nepos*, who sang:

If my bark sink, 'tis to another sea.

These sustaining moods of life are the very heart of religion, they are the moments in which the Divine finds utterance within us. No strong and sustaining life of the higher range is possible without them. The Sea-Wind finds its way from infinite spaces to finite spirits. In moments like this we most truly live.

R. T. F.

The Light of Thomas Hardy

My dear Dr. Flewelling:

May I enter a word of dissent from the interpretation of Thomas Hardy's philosophy, as set forth by the Rev. Mr. Smith in the winter *Personalist*? In my opinion Hardy was actually one of the most religious of the great British writers, if by the term, religious, we mean reverently concerned with and for the things of the spirit.

He was forever grappling with doubts which most of us allay not by struggle but by indifference. His intellectual integrity permitted of no supine acceptances. I think that no discussion of his philosophy does him justice that omits mention of his statement that, "religion... must be retained unless the world is to perish." Was this the sentiment of a man who had "resolved," as Mr. Smith says, "that the light in him should be darkness?"

Indeed not unless we fail to understand that much of his work is anguished questioning rather than asseveration. Our most noted writers today are content to sneer at life as a thing without essential dignity or final meaning: they do not concern themselves with matters so unimportant as things of the spirit. It is the very greatness of Hardy's yearning that serves to emphasize his apparent denials which are in fact searchings of the infinite.

His poem, *Survivew*, alone is to me convincing evidence of the sensitiveness and beauty of his religious spirit.

Faithfully yours,

Norfolk, Virginia.

Mary Sinton Leitch.

OUR FOREIGN LETTER

THE following letter by Professor N. Lossky was written to the Editor personally. Because of its general interest, however, both as a foreign comment on the April number of *The Personalist*, and as a discussion of the nature of metaphysics, we print it as *Our Foreign Letter*.

Dear Professor Flewelling:

Allow me to express my considerations about personalism without metaphysics and about the assertion that "every man's metaphysics is his own business."

My definition of metaphysics is as follows: Metaphysics is the science about the world as a whole. Even if we accept Kant's theory of knowledge and agree that true being ("things in themselves") transcends consciousness and therefore remains forever unknowable, yet, on the definition just given, metaphysics is possible within Kant's own system and is indeed a part of his philosophy. The world may be merely phenomenal, but it forms a certain systematic whole, and the theories about this whole indicated in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (in the Transcendental Dialectic) and in *Metaphysical Elements of Natural Science*, are metaphysics. It is significant that Kant's popular exposition of his theory of knowledge is entitled by him, "Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, as a Science."

In my defense of metaphysics I am going further. I assert that metaphysics is the science about the world as a whole, containing the knowledge of things as they are in themselves. Kant denied the possibility of such a science. He says, the subject is able to know only the objects immanent in his consciousness; but the objects immanent in my consciousness are only my presentations; they are things, as they seem to me, but not things as they are in themselves. Therefore, metaphysics as a science of things as they are in themselves is impossible: such a science cannot be epistemologically justified.

I agree with Kant that a person, having the intention to elaborate a metaphysics, has to justify his work epistemologically; I agree, also, that the subject is able to know only that, which is immanent in his consciousness. Nevertheless I assert the possibility of metaphysics as a science of things, as they are in themselves. I base this science on the refutation of Kant's epistemology and on an elaboration of epistemology, which I call *Intuitivism*.

The mistake of Kant's epistemology is the following one: he erroneously supposed that all that is immanent in the consciousness of a subject is immanent also *in the subject* of consciousness (that is, constitutes a part of his individual *psychical* life). He did not distinguish these two notions: to be immanent in consciousness of the subject, and to be immanent in the subject of consciousness.

In the case of the perception of the external world, e. g., when I observe the oscillation of a pendulum, only the act of my attention is immanent both in my consciousness and in me, as subject of consciousness, but the oscillation of the pendulum becomes during my observation immanent in my consciousness and remains at the same time transcendent to me, and a part of the external world.

I have elaborated this epistemology and the corresponding system of logic during thirty years. But some details of it have been developed by me for the first time in my recent book, which has not yet been published, *Sensuous, Intellectual and Mystical Intuition*. I prove in this book that sensuous intuition has in view the *subrational* aspect of the world, intellectual intuition, the *rational* aspect, mystical intuition, the *superrational* aspect of the world and the Supercosmic Being (God).

On the basis of this epistemology I justify metaphysical investigations and affirm that disagreements of metaphysicians depend not on the impossibility of this science, but on the difficulty of its problems. I should like to apply your words on religion ("Three Approaches to Life," p. 123): some *metaphysical* truths "can only be received as an experience by those who are ready to accept" them.

According to my view, metaphysics is the most important philosophical science, and personalism without metaphysics would be similar to a palace without a groundwork. The most valuable personalists, Leibniz, Renouvier, W. Stern, are metaphysicians. In that case, *The Personalist* could leave out metaphysics altogether only if it were demonstrated that some one epistemological theory, denying metaphysics, is absolutely true; and that epistemological theory, containing a persuasive justification of metaphysics, will never appear.

Now I shall try to give some short comments on the paper of Professor Wildon Carr, "The Search for Truth," in connection with the considerations expounded above. I agree with him that personalism is the theory according to which "the real units which

constitute or compose the universe are active, individual, spiritual units in ideal relations with one another" (p. 104). But this metaphysical theory is, in the writings of Professor Carr, as well as in Leibniz's philosophy, epistemologically unjustified. Professor Carr says: "Thinking can only give us thoughts; the existence of the things thought of is postulated" (105). Were this epistemology right, then personalism could be only a hypothesis; moreover, I affirm that such a theory could not arise (*sic* my book, *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*, p. 40 f.).

There is in the third part of my book, *Sensuous, Intellectual, and Mystical*, a chapter, "The Impersonal Buddhist Mysticism and the Personal Christian Mysticism." It is in some respects near to your "Three Approaches to Life."

Yours faithfully,

Prague, Czechoslovakia.

N. Lossky.

PUBLICATION NOTE

THE PUBLICATION COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION has recently been enlarged. It is now made up of A. O. Lovejoy, *Chairman*, E. A. Burt, W. A. Hammond, D. H. Parker, and S. P. Lamprecht. The committee has also taken on an added function in connection with the American Council of Learned Societies. It will review and report to the Council on requests for publication assistance and rotograph service in the field of philosophy. Application for assistance in these matters will hereafter be made to or referred to the Publication Committee of the Association.

For the Board of Officers of the American
Philosophical Association,

H. G. TOWNSEND, *Secretary*.

ALONG THE BOOKSHELF

Empirical Idealism

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
AND EXISTENCE, by *W. T. Stace*.
Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1932. Pp.
x, 455. \$5.00.

Several years ago Dr. W. T. Stace retired from the Ceylon civil service to join the staff of philosophy in Princeton University. More recently he has published *The Theory of Knowledge and Existence*, which comprises an important and independent enquiry into the foundations of epistemology. Returning to the rigorous standpoint of Descartes, whom he criticizes for having erred in affirming a substantial ego as ultimately certain, Professor Stace rejoins British empiricism at the point where Berkeley left off and where the desert wanderings of Hume began. Epistemology, in his opinion, is an empirical science, and the problem to which he devotes himself is that of indicating how, claiming that "Knowledge is everywhere tied to the given," the world in which we live is constructed by the mind out of the meagre data of direct experience. Empiricism, he believes, has failed because of an over-simplification, an emasculation, of the given. Our world of existence or being, according to the writer, divides into two distinct parts, namely, facts and constructions (or fictions). Facts, in turn, are divided into two types, data and other facts. Data comprise what is directly known by an individual, namely, his mental processes, his sensory and imaginal presentations, duration and

extension-spreads, and certain fundamental relations such as that of resemblance. Other facts comprise other minds and their data. "Factual existence," he defines, "is the existence of whatever is, has been, or will be actually perceived by any mind at any time or place." Constructions or fictions, on the other hand, are whatever is not factual. Such constructions, in turn, are of two types, unificatory fictions, such as the notion of a public object which exists while anybody perceives it, and existential constructions, comprising entities not perceivable at all, such as an absolute physical substratum or cosmic ether.

From this frame of discussion the writer proceeds in a fresh and suggestive way to analyze the origin and nature of the knowledge revealed in our common-sense world, in mathematics, logic, and natural science. An extended analysis of the categories not only indicates their empirical origin, but reveals important distinctions between analytic or factual and constructional categories, on the one hand, and between the necessary and the unnecessary, on the other. Constructional categories, such as existence or substance, are not necessary; factual categories may be either necessary or otherwise. Being and quality, for instance, are necessary, while causality and reality are not. Thus is abandoned the Kantian notion of the category as a synthetic *a priori* principle of interpretation. The discussion of scientific knowledge is pertinent, and the remark is

worth quoting that "There is at the present day a danger of the geometrical properties of space-time becoming an anthropomorphic superstition in the same way as 'force' did."

Ontologically the author accepts "a colony of multitudes of minds, and their own private or self-inclosed order of givens," but the deeper problem of the one and the many is intentionally omitted. Opponents of Mr. Stace will claim that his dice are loaded, and that his pretense to a Cartesian rigor and its return to first certitudes is merely the unfolding of begged postulates. Mr. Stace, it will be contended, ends up as an idealist because he began so. Mr. Stace, I take it, would retort that, in his own words, "The spirit of our enquiry is entirely empirical." It is little matter whether or not his sufficient principle is exclusively that of Occam's razor, or whether the Berkeleyian postulate that *esse* is *percipi* is an independent addition. In any case, the naturalists who are leaning heavily upon the former principle of simplicity as a profound justification for their pan-objectivism will do well to examine carefully the argument of the writer, who, starting from the same postulate, ends in monadic idealism. Several minor criticisms are in order. In the first place, it is suggested, following the evolutionists, that our fundamental animal propensities to construct certain types of objects are due to the inheritance of racial experience. This, of course, is a gratuitous assumption for which little if any evidence is forthcoming. Secondly, the author sustains an ambiguity by using the word "truth" to indicate two distinct things (p. 428), namely, the agreement of

a presentation or a concept with a concept, on the one hand, and the logical coherence of a system of constructions or fictions, on the other. And in so doing he causes confusion by seeming to accept pragmatism, and yet at the same time to reject it.

From the temperamental point of view it may be objected that Dr. Stace has given us a somewhat drab account of values. He offers to the human spirit plenty of British roast beef and greens, but no caviar and orchids. This, of course, is the limitation of empiricism, in general, and not of Professor Stace's view, in particular.

Wilbur Long.

A Forerunner of Democracy

THE DE SACRAMENTO ALTARIS OF WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, edited by T. Bruce Birch. The Lutheran Literary Board, Burlington, Iowa. 1930. Pp. xlvii, 576.

In publishing the Latin text of William of Ockham on the Sacrament of the Altar, with parallel English translation, Dr. T. Bruce Birch of Wittenberg College has accomplished an important work for scholarship. Access to Ockham material has been surrounded with exceedingly great difficulty and now scholars have easy access to this, one of the most important documents in the history of medieval thought. This holds true whether or not we consider the book to have been only a clever means of introducing into theological controversy the principles of his nominalistic philosophy.

Although we believe the discussion of medieval philosophy important, and hold that the modern age neglects it to its own harm, yet the striking facts

about Ockham's philosophy are likely to be his strange forecast of modern positions.

This statement is certain to be violently resisted, though many philosophers of standing have pointed out his relation to Locke and the eventuating skepticism of Hume.

To us the more interesting modern suggestion is his arrival at the doctrine of quanta, now the goal of physical theory, and his presumption of the fictional, or suppositional character of such abstractions as an unextended point which can be multiplied into extension. Ockham was very clear in dividing the mental abstractions of hypothesis from the plain order of fact and experience. So much so that it would form a work of grace for him to be read by some of our modern philosophers.

Ockham was fundamentally sound, too, in his doctrine of God, and very modern. He saw the real relation that exists between sensuous experience which we call "fact" and emotional and moral values that exist only in and through faith. Hence he held that the existence of God was not the subject of philosophical or scientific demonstration but derives its reality as well as its value through faith alone. This is demonstrable in such a mundane value even as human love which is built on faith and is impossible on any other terms. To doubt love or to require demonstration is to destroy it and render it valueless. Similarly the values of religion lie in the great adventure, the gamble of life upon the belief in the essential goodness of the universe. One cannot exchange the "adventure" for scientific or philosophical demonstration without betray-

ing the very nature and value of religion. This is the reason that the criticisms of atheist and mechanist fall flat. They fail in the sheer understanding of religion and then wonder why their criticisms are not devastating to men to whom the reality of faith and the knowledge of God are the profoundest realities of experience. Of these facts Ockham was in possession in a day laboring under the restrictions of a bread and butter philosophy, and it is of great value to have his work set before us in such clear and scholarly fashion. No philosophical library can be complete without it.

Of exceedingly great value is the author's introduction, and the work is a great credit to the Lutheran Literary Board who published it. Now and then, carelessness has crept into the proof-reading, as when on page xxxi of the introduction we learn with amusement that Bertrand Russell is the author of a book entitled *Our Knowledge of the Eternal World*.

R. T. F.

Social and Scientific Method

LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER. Essays in Legal Philosophy, by *Morris R. Cohen*. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York. 1933. Pp. lx, 403.

AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD, by *Morris R. Cohen* and *Ernest Nagel*. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York. 1934. Pp. xii, 469.

THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE, by *William G. Ballantine*. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 1933. Pp. 230.

The field of law has not been uninfluenced by those newer currents in the intellectual weather which have brought revolutionary changes into sci-

ence, theology, economics, and ethics. The social character of law, and the postulative basis of the system of legal interpretation, which changes from age to age, is now being clearly indicated by the newer thinkers. Among the outstanding names of the liberal and progressive school is that of Professor Morris R. Cohen, whose studies in the philosophy of law, covering a quarter of a century, have in no small measure contributed to the spread of the newer outlook—a development, in his own words, “so free, vigorous, and lively as to have seemed unbelievable in the years before the war, when the Conference on Legal and Social Philosophy could not interest more than a handful of law-teachers.” Much of his writing in this field, however, has been occasional, in the form of book reviews and magazine articles, and has been in danger of becoming lost in the bound volumes of periodical literature. It is therefore a genuine service to have collected this scattered and inaccessible material in the volume, *Law and Reason*. Here the many-faceted aspects of law are discussed in that vigorous, biting, and succinct manner characteristic of controversial writing. The contents are divided into four parts entitled, *The Social Scene*, *Law and the Social Order*, *Law and Reason*, and *Contemporary Legal Philosophy*.

W. H. L.

In *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* by Cohen and Nagel we have a first book in logic that will do for students and teachers what such a book ought to do for them. For students, the text lends itself admirably to self-training; for

teachers, to varied uses in the classroom. The book professedly aims to unite “the realistic formalism of Aristotle, the scientific penetration of Peirce, the pedagogical soundness of Dewey, and the mathematical rigor of Russell.”

Logic is defined as “the science of the weight of evidence” and is set forth as dealing with two kinds of inference, necessary and probable. The treatment of formal logic is based on the possible relations of truth-value between propositions; the treatment of scientific method, on the deductive elaboration of alternative propositions as hypotheses and the comparison of their consequences with observable phenomena. Certain few of the traditional emphases in formal logic are omitted in favor of the elements of mathematical logic; and scientific method has been rendered both systematically intelligible and teachable. Indeed, the outstanding merit of the book is the adequacy with which the entire field of elementary logic is covered.

The general philosophic standpoint reflected may perhaps be fittingly described as an “objective relativism.” Thus classification is shown to be both (1) artificial and (2) natural; namely, inasmuch as in classification (1) a selection is made (2) of actual common traits.

Much material not usually offered in elementary texts has been included (as, e. g., the logic of measurement and the logic of fictions); some of the topics are developed in a novel manner (as, e. g., the rules of the syllogism and the methods of experimental inquiry); many of the expositions exhibit skill in

avoiding oversimplification and similar pitfalls (as, e. g., the discussion of hypotheses); and unfailingly the authors point out the theoretical and practical significance of logical principles (as in the case of the distinction between contradiction and contrariety, the interpretation of statistics, and the methods of critical evaluation). Where controversial issues are raised, they are adjudicated with fairness and critical insight (instances in point being the question of the existential import of propositions, and especially the varied claims made for logic and scientific method). Also the exercises appended are an improvement on most.

The presentation throughout is marked by eminent clarity, accuracy, readability, and dignity.

Richard Hope.

The Logic of Science by William G. Ballantine appears to be the reissue of a work originally (in 1930) entitled *The Basis of Belief*. It would seem to need some courage nowadays to put forward so clear, simple, and slight an account of so contentious a subject as this little work contains. One is tempted at first to suspect the invincible valor of ignorance, until one observes how carefully the author confines his little craft to the well-charted shallows of the John Stuart Millpond, and avoids the tempestuous deeps of modern epistemology. One then inclines to attribute its character rather to prudence. However, to judge by the list of his works, Dr. Ballantine's main interest would appear to be in theology.

F. C. S. Schiller.

Meaning and Art

PHILOSOPHY AND POETRY, by George Boas. Wheaton College Press, Norton, Massachusetts. 1932. Pp. 34. \$0.75.

MUSIC AND MEANING, by Elizabeth Robinson Woods. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1932. Pp. viii, 101. \$2.00.

A GRAMMAR OF THE ARTS, by Sir Charles Holmes, with an introduction by John C. Van Dyke. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1932. Pp. xlii, 242. \$2.50.

It is patent that no satisfactory solution of the problem of meaning is to be expected without a thorough investigation of spiritual experience, in general, and of both the content and expressive forms of fine art, in particular. A suggestive but disappointing move in this direction is Professor Boas' well written *Philosophy and Poetry*, the Annie Talbot Cole lecture for 1932. We listen eagerly when the author declares as his thesis that "a philosophic poem is philosophy made concrete"; but we pass on to disappointment when we discover that by this is really intended an assertion that meaning is logical and cosmological, while the stuff of art, which is metaphoric, is meaningless because not logical. The function of art, it appears, is not ontological at all; rather is it significant merely as pronouncing estimates of approval or disapproval. I fail to understand the author's view that "One may argue about propositions; one may not argue about figures of speech." This seems patently false, as is the author's opposing truth (logic) to "emotional co-efficient" (poetry). The general doctrine of the lecture is illustrated by an extended reference to Bridge's *Testament of Beauty*, toward which the au-

thor sometimes directs a somewhat hypersensitive and unjust criticism (for example, pp. 19 and 29). The meaning of meaning and the philosophic role of fine art must remain obscure until we can come to deeper grips with the problem than intellectualism and scientism are capable of doing.

A more acute and extended analysis of the problem of meaning is to be found in the illuminating essay, *Music and Meaning*, by Elizabeth Robinson Woods. At the outset this writer makes a fundamental distinction between extrinsic meaning (symbolism and symbolic reference) and intrinsic meaning, with the pertinent observation that "over-emphasis on symbolism is one great obstacle to a proper understanding" of the general problem of significance. Intrinsic meaning is defined as coherence or structure, an aesthetic interpretation, and one chapter is devoted to an indication of such structure in music, which relates it to mathematics and pure logic. It is a profound and much needed observation which the author gives us that art is not fictional; rather, "art, which is the fruit of genuinely sensitive and disinterested perception, is able to reveal those deep lying relations which despite our usual blindness permeate the world." Meaning and value, although distinguishable, in fact coalesce. For value as affective, it is suggested, may be considered as a "vital concomitant of meaning." Indeed, the integration meaning exhibits "is primarily a product of feeling," and hence there is truth in St. Bernard's "*Amo ut intelligam*." In thus calling to our attention the ontological importance of

the higher meanings, involved in religion, grace, and finer love, the author has placed the emphasis where it is much needed. And, as the thesis of this book suggests, no satisfactory solution of the problem of significance can be definitive which fails to make sound use of the higher values embodied in art and religion, which, in the language of the common man, give "meaning" to life and to the world.

W. H. L.

A Grammar of the Arts is, as Sir Charles Holmes says in his preface, compiled as a handbook or guide for the use of teachers and visitors who find themselves in museums and galleries in the midst of countless treasures of art which they would like to be able to explain to themselves and to others. But this is not the sort of book to have in your hand when you visit a museum, although it is an excellent book for all who are interested in the representational, constructive and decorative arts, and who would know something of the principles, the purpose, the ideals and the conditions of the various arts. As a *Grammar of the Arts* it is a study of the different forms of art and their relations to one another, their idioms, variants and guiding principles, their limitations and potentialities. Painting, architecture, engraving, etching, lithography, mezzotint, porcelain, glass, iron-work, are all dealt with, and there is no one who can write on such subjects with greater authority or in so clear and direct a manner as Sir Charles Holmes. Art is primarily skill, skill in the making of things that when made are delightful apart from any utilitar-

ian purpose they might have. A grammar of the arts is to enable us to know art, not as the craftsman knows it in the doing of it, but to know it as we might say we know our friends, to be on friendly terms with it, able to hob-nob with it, to respond to its arrangements of proportion, to its order, its clarity, its radiance—in a word to its beauty. If art is primarily skill, creation is the primary impulse of art. "The musician is inspired to create things that are good to hear. The poet and the man of letters are inspired to create things that are good to be read. The painter, the sculptor, and the craftsman are inspired to create things that are good to see. It is the thrill of creation, the excitement of making something new, which starts each of them upon his labor and sustains him through it. As the new creation comes to life under his hand, the artist experiences the pleasure of supreme power. What he fashions is his to alter, to embellish, or to destroy. He is the monarch, the god, of his own little world. . . . But the new thing which the artist creates has a life of its own, a life which may last long after its creator is dead and forgotten. In that vital element his spirit lives on, immortal, and is kept in touch with all similar spirits who come into contact with it henceforth. So the carvings and paintings of Palaeolithic man still convey to us, after ten or twelve thousand years, something of the spirit and delight of those remote fore-runners of our race. We can still share in the thrill of creative excitement that brought these images into being. To all those anxious to know what art is this book will appeal. It is

written not from the point of view of the artist but as a guide for the audience and as such it is excellent.

Geraldine Carr.

Biography

CARDINAL NEWMAN AND WILLIAM FROUDE, by *Gordon Huntington Harper*. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1933.

GOETHE CENTENARY PAPERS, edited by *Marten Schutze*. The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago. 1933. Pp. vi, 174. \$1.25.

TESTAMENT OF YOUTH. An Autobiographical Study of the Years 1900-1925. By *Vera Brittain*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1933. Pp. 661. \$2.50.

Students of the Victorian era owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Harper, for he has ploughed a very rich furrow in that field of letters. Not only has he located, but he has had access to a series of intensely interesting epistles which, save for slight excerpts, have not been published heretofore. Not only do these shed light, but they throw a spotlight on the curious state of affairs that was a result of The Oxford Movement, and, what is of far greater importance, they add greatly to the stature of nobility of Cardinal Newman.

Within his soul, Newman had the stuff of which saints are made. Unlike his showier and more successful rival, Cardinal Manning, he was no bootlicker and no runner after temporal power. Manning had the soul of a lackey and from an underfootman he became a *major domo* in the house of the pope. To him, God was a profitable tale, while to Newman, God was a living, breathing, intensely beautiful being who had created man in his own image.

The Cardinal's soul-struggle is superbly portrayed in Dr. Harper's masterly synthesis, and he has helped turn back the clock and has thrust himself into a passion of a yesterday to make us realize how burning were questions, the answers to which have been found long since, or reduced to lesser irritants.

Darwin and science caused a new renaissance during the Victorian era, and Newman, doubting the divinity of his Anglican creed, went over to Rome. Others became agnostics and atheists, and still others hugged the cloak of the Anglican Church about their lean or paunchy frames more firmly than ever.

Newman's gaze remained direct, fearless and crystal-clear, nor was this due to any soporific of smugness, but to the outcome of the soul-struggle of one who could walk with God after having trod the paths of the gardens of *Doubting Castle*.

As Dr. Harper correctly and succinctly states, Newman's letters are a *catharsis of his religious doubts and emotions*, for doubt he did, and mightily, but this turned him toward Rome, his logical home, the home of any man who wishes to become imbued with a syllogism whose major premise he cares to question but little. And did not Newman have that rare quality of being a Christian first and a priest afterward? Furthermore he believed firmly that the occupation of a priest was to receive those who were weary and heavy-laden that he might give them rest. Nor did he cease to believe this after he had become a prince of the church.

Froude was a scientist, with a scientist's curiosity and a sci-

entist's insistence upon wanting things proved before acceptance, or reduced to hypotheses so reasonable that absence of proof would not give rise to doubt. To him the Roman Catholic hypothesis seemed unreasonable, but to Newman it had ceased to be an hypothesis and had become truth incarnate.

Dr. Harper shows us that William Froude was just as ardent a seeker after truth as was Newman and he estimates him as *holding intellectual honesty above every other ideal*.

Here is an epistolary duel between an ecclesiastic and a scientist, the illative consequence being the souls of those who were near and dear to both of them, a duel between ghostly father and fleshly father; ghostly husbandman and fleshly husband, gnosticism versus agnosticism.

Both men were noble-minded, both were honest. Newman was the type of man who, had he lived in the times of Torquemada, would have tortured men's bodies to save their souls without having even a hint of sadism. Never could he have cloaked cruelty beneath priestly vestments of holy respectability. He was thoroughly aware of the fact that he was doing everything in his power to accomplish an end that would cause distress to a dear friend, and had he been a man of smaller calibre he might have refrained from so doing, but as Dr. Harper informs us, *he displayed to an amazing degree the truly philosophic cast of mind which enabled him to disregard passionately a problem which was at the same time of vital conse-*

quence. His genius bore the characteristic stamp of humility.

He was no man to take away an Anglican faith from people, unless he felt that by replacing it with a Catholic, he had given one pound of pure gold for one pound of dross. Furthermore, he considered it to be his bounden duty not to be circumscribed by any earthly friendship. And when a ghostly friendship led dear ones toward the light, it was both logical and even ethical to leave one dear friend behind in darkness. It speaks well for William Froude's type of mentality that he did not shut his heart to the man who was so hurting him.

In this epistolary duel, both antagonist and protagonist are imbued with a sense of fair play and both of them are British in the best sense of the word.

Thanks to the industry of Dr. Harper, the results of his research have shed much light on this almost century-old controversy. A true scholar, he has made two flowers bloom where one bloomed before, and he has proved himself to be anything but a pedant who delights in picking lice off the body of learning. His is a vital and pertinent scholarship, not a dead and impertinent one, and the reader is amply repaid for reading this intensely human, interesting work, the least of whose virtues is the terse, masterly synthesis of its author-compiler.

William Van Wyck.

Goethe Centenary Papers comprise a series of addresses delivered at the Goethe celebration held at the University of Chicago on March 8 and 9, 1932. Presented with a cultured public in mind, the papers are of uni-

form and sound scholarship, and are a worthy addition to Goethe literature. From the point of view of wider interest the more significant studies are those discussing Goethe and the German spirit, Goethe in English literature, Goethe and France, Goethe and present-day German writers, Emerson's Goethe, and Goethe and Philosophy. Possibly from the standpoint of an appreciation of the wholeness and comprehensive enthusiasms of the poet it is unfortunate that no mention is made of his scientific and political activities. This omission may be justified, however, by the purpose of the series, namely, to quote the editor, Professor Martin Schutz,

"of making as far as possible, a well-rounded, imaginative, and instructive presentation of Goethe's poetic and cultural significance."

In this era of a recrudescence of scientism, with its reliance upon the analytic method and the categories of discursive logic and physics, we will do well to give thoughtful attention to the epistemological significance of the poets of the nineteenth century. And among these it would be an impertinence to neglect him who had written to Eckermann:

"Every situation, nay, every moment, is of infinite value, for it is representative of the whole of eternity."

W. H. L.

Vera Brittain waited for ten years after the events to write the record of an English girl's life from 1900 to 1925—but it is a question whether she had yet arrived at the maturity to make her judgments in any sense final or anything more than loosely tentative and partial. There are such ups and downs here of insight and snap judgments that one is puzzled

whether to call the book wisdom or foolishness. However, for any who want to discover the psychology of the younger generation which found itself in the heart of the war, there is abundant fact and fancy here to induce an understanding of much war and post-war psychology.

Miss Brittain has not written a mere story but has endeavored to give us the history of the psychological development of human lives under the influence of war years, and after that throws much light upon events now contemporary. She has accomplished her task in a notable manner.

We see here, the impatience with the old order which produced the war, and the condemnation of the irrelevant good with the relevant bad. This is, of course, after the manner of youth which will not discriminate but will have wholesale acceptance or wholesale condemnation and nothing else. On the other hand, there are flashes of insight from which the world might take a lesson, as when she writes:

I have had to learn again and again the terrible truth of George Eliot's words about the invasion of personal preoccupations by the larger destinies of mankind, and at last to recognize that no life is really private, or isolated, or self-sufficient. People's lives were entirely their own, perhaps—and more justifiably—when the world seemed enormous, and all its comings and goings were slow and deliberate. But this is no longer, and never will be again, since man's inventions have eliminated so much of distance and time; for better, for worse, we are now each of us part of the surge and swell of great economic and political movements, and whatever we do, as individuals or as nations, deeply affects everyone else. . . . It may be that our generation will go down in history as the first to un-

derstand that not a single man or woman can now live in disregarding isolation from his or her world.

On the whole, this biographical novel is a distinct achievement.

R. T. F.

Religion and Immortality

THE BUDDHA AND THE CHRIST, An Exploration of the Meaning of the Universe and of the Purpose of Human Life. The Hampton Lectures of 1932. By *Burnett Hillman Streeter*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1933. Pp. xiii, 336. \$2.00.

SPINOZA, THE BIOSOPHER, by *Fredrick Kettner*. Introduction by *Nicholas Roerich*. Roerich Museum Press, New York. 1932. Pp. 263. \$2.50.

IMMORTALITY AND THE COSMIC PROCESS, by *Shailer Mathews*. The Ingersoll Lectures, 1933. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1933. Pp. 51. \$1.00.

A visit to Japan, some three years ago, and an invitation to deliver the Hampton lectures for 1932, provided Canon Street-er with inspiration for a re-statement of his general religious and philosophical views in *The Buddha and the Christ*. Taking as his point of departure the thesis of his earlier volume, *Reality*, that scientific knowledge is symbolic, abstract and inadequate for the full description of the actual, the author lays down the principle that no ontology can be accepted which fails to provide decently for the richer aspects of human experience, codified in the institutional and cultural life, and given supreme expression in religion. The first part of this re-examination of the fundamental problems and beliefs of man is devoted to a brief statement and comparison of the two great international religions, Buddhism and Christianity, to see "writ

large the content of personal life at its maximum both of elevation and intensity." His interest, the author explains, is practical rather than speculative. He is convinced that "At the present moment the world has a greater need of religion than of science," and he believes that "the quest for religious truth is the great adventure for which humanity now calls." The substance of his investigation of the teaching of Buddha is the conclusion that

"the barrier which separates the Buddha from Christ is due, in the last resort, more to the intellectual theories which he inherited than to disagreement in the findings of his own very original moral insight. Where the Buddha was most himself, there he was most like Christ."

The latter half of the volume brings to bear both speculative insight and his conclusions concerning religious fact upon the problem of religion and reality, pain, action and the ideal, and immortality.

W. H. L.

Just as the decline of paganism and the increasing failure of Greco-Roman theology to commend itself to the ancient world led to a search for philosophies that might do the work of religion, so the weakened hold of Christian theology upon the mind and the imagination of today has turned many to philosophy, if perchance they may find there the consolations and the design for living with which Christianity is no longer able to supply them. And just as the decay of the ancient faith inspired nothing new for many centuries, but drove men rather to refurbish and re-light the lamps already at hand, of older systems, for their guidance, so

at the present moment those for whom Christianity no longer has a message are not so much creating new philosophies to fill the new needs that religion in its traditional Western crystallization can no longer satisfy as looking back to the past, to philosophies already in existence, for comfort and illumination.

It is not surprising, in these circumstances, to find Spinoza becoming the center of a religious cult. If a philosophical system can become the core of a religion, and a philosopher its founder and prophet—which I think doubtful—certainly no philosopher is better qualified to do so by the breadth, the profundity, and the magnificence of his teaching, and by the nobility of the moral outlook and conduct he inspires, than is Spinoza. Furthermore, congenial rather than antagonistic to the naturalistic mood of the present world, abounding in understanding and compassion for the limitations set by nature upon man, and at the same time pointing out to him the immense heights to which he may ascend in spite of his mortality and finitude, the Spinozistic system is perhaps of all philosophies the best fitted to bring religious consolation and moral stability to the times in which we are living, and to enable us to face with equanimity the present *Gotterdammerung*.

It is with an ardent belief in the salvation to be found in believing upon Spinoza that Dr. Kettner, leader of the Spinoza Centre of the Roerich Museum, has written the book under consideration. Indeed, he goes so far as to see in the Spinozistic system the religion of the future which is to take the place of our

outworn creeds. And as a prophet of the new dispensation he addresses himself with enthusiasm to expounding the great teachings of his master and to shedding their radiance upon the multitude that, deprived of the old certainties and sanctions, grope for a new light. The book itself, however, is a disappointment. In evident scholarship it cannot compare with the works, say, of Pollock and Joachim and McKeon (to cite the more popular English discussions), and as an exposition it does little to mitigate the difficulties of Spinoza's austere style and geometrical method, and to make him more comprehensible, not to speak of more attractive, to the lay reader. Nor is the warmth of Dr. Kettner's enthusiasm for his subject sufficiently felt in his pleading to communicate itself to others. In short, the book falls short both as an illuminating comment and an efficient work of propaganda.

Nevertheless, it is gratifying to know that a campaign in favor of Spinoza is under way, and that men's eyes are being once more lifted to that serene and splendid mountain peak which towers so high above the petty optimisms and pessimisms, the opportunisms and moral materialisms, the wistfulness and the evasions that infect so much of our thinking and our action, and add so much to our present confusion. And it is good to know of the Spinoza Centre, where Dr. Kettner is busy teaching a band of zealous disciples the greatest philosophy to live by that the modern world has yet produced.

B. A. G. Fuller.

Shailer Matthews in *Immortality and the Cosmic Process* dis-

closes the present poverty of our faith regarding immortality and refuses to blink those objections against it which are so prominent in present day thought. He indicates how little there was in Hebraic teaching to sustain the doctrine, and shows how the ancient traditions bring us little faith. At the same time, using the newer concepts of science divorced from materialism, he demonstrates that personal survival must be accepted like any scientific event as a cosmic fact. Since even the atom no longer rests on the theory of physical continua, personality may be put upon the same basis and may be considered as independent of a physical body. The argument for immortality is then seen to rest upon the worth of the person, and "whether all persons will survive death would seem to depend upon the extent to which men meet the conditions requisite for the development of a personality."

R. T. F.

Poetry and Life

AN ODYSSEY OF THE SOUL: SHELLEY'S ALASTOR, by *Harold Leroy Hoffman*. Columbia University Press, New York. 1933. Pp. 173. \$2.50.

GLORY OF EARTH, by *Anderson M. Scruggs*. Oglethorpe University Press. Oglethorpe University, Georgia. 1933. Pp. 95.

APPLES OF SODOM, by *Helen Estelle de Camp*. Banner Press, Emory University, Georgia. 1933. Pp. 48.

STEPHEN FOSTER, AMERICA'S TROUBADOUR, by *John Tasker Howard*. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 1934. Pp. xiii, 445. \$3.50.

Professor Hoffman's minute study of Shelley's "Alastor" is the latest of a series of attempts to "explain" one of the most difficult poems of a great artist in

English verse. Four previous attempts are cited by the author: that of Professor Dowden, who thought the poem Shelley's indictment of his own over-idealistic tendency; that of J. A. Symonds, who identified the idea of love and beauty in "Alastor" with Plato's *Symposium* and criticized "Alastor" as possessing a "somewhat unhealthy vein of sentiment"; that of Mr. Arthur Clutton-Brock, who accused Shelley of a lack of art in the management of his theme, especially by losing it in description; and that of Professor Havens, who concluded that Shelley began the poem with no definite purpose in mind and that the title and Preface are inconsistent with the poem itself.

Professor Hoffman takes issue with the implied or expressed criticism of Shelley in all these views and sets himself to vindicate the poet by demonstrating (1) "that the poem is both an intelligible and an intelligent composition. To demonstrate its consistency is the first task of this book," (2) that the imagery (the wealth of descriptive matter that bothered Clutton-Brock) is actually relevant to the theme. To these two purposes are devoted the two chapters on "Allegory" and "Imagery" respectively, constituting the bulk of the treatment. In addressing himself to the first task, the author reminds us of Shelley's own words: "Alastor may be considered as allegorical of one of the most interesting situations of the human mind." Hence we must interpret the poem, not, to be sure, as a pure allegory like "The Faerie Queene" or "The Pilgrim's Progress," but as a poetic representation of an unfortunate

tendency of the mind, employing symbolic rather than merely descriptive methods. This unfortunate tendency, according to Hoffman, is that *love of self* which results in solitude (compare the sub-title, "The Spirit of Solitude"), isolation from one's fellow-beings, and eventual destruction. In attacking the second problem, that of the imagery of the poem, the author disclaims doing for "Alastor" "what has been so superbly done by Professor Lowes for 'The Ancient Mariner' and for 'Kubla Khan' in *The Road to Xanadu*." Yet he has gone perhaps as far as one may in ferreting out the sources, in Shelley's reading and observation, of the multitudinous images from nature and human story that attached themselves to Shelley's theme and made the pilgrimage of Shelley's "poet" so fanciful and bizarre as to be unexplainable even by the expert. The reader is not always convinced that Professor Hoffman's sources can be seen in the passages cited, but on the whole the search has been very rewarding and certainly illuminating. The author will convince most of his readers that he has been measurably successful in his two objectives and that, though "Alastor" may not be a great poem, it is yet a beautiful and consistent work of art. Full and precise notes and a good bibliography are further testimony to the scholarship of this sound and very readable study.

Louis Wann.

Glory of Earth, by Anderson M. Scruggs, and *Apples of Sodom*, by Helen Estelle de Camp, offer as interesting a comparison in poetic reaction, even to their

titles, as one might expect to find in these days.

The author of *Apples of Sodom* announces her theme clearly: "The poems in this book have to do with love too freely given and the bitter aftermath. Hence the symbol, 'Apples of Sodom,' is used, since love was also found to be 'beautiful to the eye, but ashes to the taste.'" The burden of this entire group of rhymed poems, consisting of ten sonnets, a number of quatrain poems, and many of irregular form, is the anguish of the recently disillusioned love of a woman, who seeks solace, for the most part in vain, in the truth and beauty of Nature. The last stanza of "Spring is at Hand" may serve fairly to suggest the tone of the book:

Spring is at hand, and Winter has
failed behind.
I know. I plainly read what all can
see.
Yet no gentle wind unfreezes my
winter mind.
No bird sits warming his wing in the
heart of me.

The merit of these poems is their genuineness—there is no sentimental attempt to sing of a "way out" where the way is obviously blocked, at least for the present. Among the best poems are "Not that I Cherish Less," "Memory of the Sea," "Estrangement," "Shall I Forget," and the sonnet series headed by "Apples of Sodom." So gripping is the thought at times that one feels he is reading free verse and not rhymed verse. Yet it may be doubted whether it required so many poems to do justice to the mood of the book. One-third of the number would suffice.

Very jauntily, on the other hand, does Mr. Scruggs proclaim the "Glory of Earth," as

in his opening poem, "Song for Dark Days":

He is alien to all grief whose heart
Has learned the wisdom hills and
woodlands know.

or in "Supreme Lover":

I know that I shall never find
In all of lovely womankind,
In wistful eyes or lips of mirth,
A greater lover than the earth.

So the poet sings the eternal praise of trees and rain and earth, with only a suggestion, as in the effective poem "Glory to Them," of the worth of men themselves. A little of this facile praise of Nature goes a long way. One doubts whether the poet has ever really tested the power of Nature's solace after eating of the apples of Sodom. One often forgets that Miss de Camp is rhyming; one never forgets that Mr. Scruggs is doing little else. A few of these poems are worth-while: "Only the Dream is Real," "Go to a Tree," "Negro Settlement," "Old Houses," and "Glory to Them." The rest we have all read before.

L. W.

Who can estimate the place in the final history of America of Stephen Foster, whose life is now interestingly and fully set forth by John Tasker Howard? If the old saying is true about not caring who makes the laws if one can write the songs of a people, then Stephen Foster, who is as yet our predominantly recognized folk-poet, must be awarded a very high place in American life. One thinks instinctively of James Whitcomb Riley, but even Riley has scarcely had the influence—because it was so different—that has come to Foster through his songs. And always his songs are to be reminders of days now gone, days that will linger in the

sentiments of the American people, days connected with the first flush of national achievement, wealth, and experience. To have contributed such songs as *My Old Kentucky Home* and *Suwannee River* to the songs of a nation is to exert an undying influence. Hosts of people should be happy to possess themselves of this well-executed and interesting book.

R. T. F.

Miscellaneous

A HISTORY OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC, by Cyril E. Robinson. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 1932. Pp. xi, 471. \$3.00.

The researches of scholarship are continuing to bring to light new historical material so that this new *History of the Roman Republic* is timely. Its author, Cyril E. Robinson, of Winchester College, has already won a good reputation for his historical writing which is fully sustained by the present volume. Little stress is laid upon the legendary stories of the founding of Rome, but much attention is paid to the racial and political development of the Roman people, the influence upon them of Greek thought, and the personalities prominent in the last hundred years of the Republic.

There is an abundance of maps and chronological tables which add to the value of the book.

R. T. F.

PERSONALITY, THE CRUX OF SOCIAL INTERCOURSE, by A. A. Roback. Sci-Art Publishers, Cambridge, Mass. 1931. Pp. 144.

Dr. Roback's little book, *Personality, the Crux of Social Intercourse* is written for the special

consideration of the layman who desires to know the secret of what is vulgarly known as "it." He disavows the theories of the Behaviorists, for he believes improvement in personality is possible, and not always connected with character. We think he errs here; in fact he himself calls attention to the failure of any attempt to assume friendliness one does not feel, which is like the assumed jocularity which always ends in a smirk or a soul-revealing grin. He writes discriminatingly and truly when he says that "one's life direction, or one's life-pattern, is the key to one's personality; and one's life-pattern is always revealed in the value one sets on certain things."

What he gives is so good that one feels discouraged that he has not gone more deeply nor more definitely into his subject. A historian of philosophy would be inclined to quarrel with his statement that "Hegel was the initiator of the philosophy of personality."

R. T. F.

RESPONSIBILITY: Its Development through Punishment and Reward, by Lawrence Sears, Columbia University Press, New York. 1932. \$2.50.

This study is an analysis of that aspect of moral education which aims at the development of responsibility in children. First an analysis is made of the views of seven of the great writers in the history of theoretical ethics, viz., Bentham, Mill, Bain, Westermarck, Green, Bradley and Dewey. The second part consists of the developmental record of twelve case studies of children in order to discover empirically the causes of anti-social behaviour, and the place of punishment and reward as a means of developing a sense of responsibility.

In the third part the theories are re-examined in the light of the empirical data revealed in the case studies. Here the specific question is raised as to the effectiveness of punishment. The evidence seems to show that it is ineffective and dangerous when used capriciously, when weakly abandoned or if the reason for it or the justice of it are not understood. Punishment in anger or when administered by one who is not respected defeats its purpose. The common notion that punishment is inevitably accompanied by an attitude of blame or resentment is challenged. Punishment is defined as "any means which may be used to make a person dissatisfied with some existing habit." (140)

The theoretical view adopted by the author is that of Dewey as against the other views examined. In conformity with this view the importance of the environment is stressed as an instrument of control, and moral problems are seen as social problems essentially.

The question of determinism versus freedom inevitably arises, and the position adopted is again that of Dewey. It is held that determinism and mechanism are not identical. Indeterminism is understood as admitting chance and mechanism, whereas determinism is taken to mean intelligence determined by its motives. Intelligence is defined as that capacity of the self which guarantees that mechanical causality will not be the only kind of causality. Freedom then is intelligent choice—between available possibilities, not undetermined choice.

In the last analysis the problem of the development of responsibility is synonymous with the development of intelligence. Moral education is thus not simply a matter

of social control but of the development of intelligence, imagination and sympathy.

H. L. S.

CONFLICTS OF PRINCIPLE, by Abbott Lawrence Lowell. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 1932. Pp. vi, 161.

This little book by the former president of Harvard University consists of a penetrating analysis of the nature of principles commonly accepted as universal, and an exposition of the conflicts which arise when two inconsistent principles clash.

The problem which confronts us in personal as well as social conduct is to discover the appropriate limits between conjugate principles. The conflict is illustrated and elaborated as between *laissez faire* and governmental control of industry, personal liberty and conformity, consent and force, conflicting political and educational theories, patriotism and humanitarianism.

While the book is written for the general cultivated reader and not solely for philosophers, it has a significant application to the field of philosophy in which the identical problem exists, viz., that of finding the appropriate limits between conjugate principles for which claims of universality are made.

H. L. S.

PHYLOANALYSIS. A Study in the Group or Phyletic Method of Behavior-Analysis. By William Galt. Preface by Triggant Burrow. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. London, Pp. 151. 2s. 6d.

In William Galt's *Phyloanalysis* we are reminded of the place, in our reactions to those around us, taken by the social image which we have already set up for ourselves. Our irritations thus grow quite as much out of our egoistic

prepossessions as from any actual conditions in the social situation. We confess that when we have said this we seem to have gotten the gist of what the book is about. It seems pathetic that one should be so embroiled in the attempt to express himself in scientific terms that he becomes so obscure. A good example of this is the definition of psychoanalysis as having for its object

To synthesize or reintegrate both in the individual and in the species the organism's functional coherences by means of an analysis or objective observation of those social divergences of attention and behavior which depart from this phyletic norm through man's racial inadvertence of adaptation as expressed ontologically in the incident of the parents' early interception of the child's spontaneous interest or attention.

We believe we understand these words but it is difficult to believe that it makes a profound difference whether we do or not.

R. T. F.

THE DAWN OF CONSCIENCE. *James Henry Breasted.* Scribner's. New York. \$3.00.

All serious minded people are perplexed, and some of us wholly disillusioned at the spectacle of modern man so largely dominated by the destructive power which science, and his enormously increased weapon making ability have placed in his hands. Morally, man is still a child playing in a nursery full of the most dangerous toys, which he has not yet learned to handle, and with which he continually inflicts serious injury not only on himself, but on the whole structure in which he lives. Recent economic history would indicate that such infantile limitations are not confined to morals alone, while neither the men of science nor the historians are evaluating man's present situation in full recogni-

tion of the fact that the emergence of conscience as a social force is an event of yesterday, and as truly a datable event as the gradual use of metals. Accordingly, the resulting Age of Character is therefore little more than about 4,000 years of age. Did not Emerson write "in our barbarous society, the influence of character is still in its infancy"?

According to Dr. Breasted, an Age of Weapons and therefore that of physical force has been operating for over a million years, accompanied by a gradual enlightenment of mankind. The slow transition to the Age of Character is really an achievement of yesterday, although so new that man of today is not yet aware that he has so recently tread into a country he has not yet learned to possess. The outstanding purpose of the book is to demonstrate that the process of human advance which brought forth character is still unfinished and going on. The decipherment of the lost languages of the Near East, especially those of Egypt where the earliest transcendental vision of social idealism arose, has enabled us to read written records which disclose the dawn of conscience, and the stages by which it became a social force to produce the Age of Character at which we stand, for the higher and more elusive inner capacities arising from social experiences have been sociologically at work for but a brief time. Of no small importance is Dr. Breasted's conception that so far as our chief moral legacy is concerned, we are heirs of the early life of man as a whole, and not alone of the Hebrews. Indeed, our author indicates an Egyptian origin for many of the gems of Hebrew sacred literature.

Moral development is thus an unfinished process. If for the race, how much more true for the individual, and this is our greatest reason for hopefulness. The possibilities of its future are unlimited, and it is our responsibility to bring the vast significance of this new fact to bear as a practical influence upon our conduct. Just as the light of character once dawned in a darkness which had never known such light before it, it is felt that the growth of the light will illumine realms of being that still lie unrealized in the unfathomed ages towards which our limited vision of today looks out but does not see. This then, is Dr. Breasted's conclusion from long years of study of the fragments of Egyptian antiquity, and that "conscience," "immorality," moral order and the other mighty intangibles upon which civilization is founded were born to our present knowledge in the valley of the Nile. This book is a superb interpretation.

N. M. GRIER.

BELIEF IN MAN, by *Philip S. Richards*. Farrar and Rinehart, New York. 1932. Pp. xxiii, 193. \$2.50.

There is a strangely old-fashioned and fundamentalist flavor about this pleasantly written and often suggestive volume, which tilts pertinaciously against what its author regards as modernism, naturalism, evolutionism and relativity. In Mr. Richards' view "the question is no longer whether we can believe in God, or whether, and in what

sense, we can retain our belief in man" (p. viii). He himself is a Humanist, who upholds "the traditional Belief in Man" (p. 3), and considers him a Real Kind and as such possessed of "a unique and unchanging nature" (p. xviii), "absolutely and essentially different from the rest of creatures" (p. xxii), and so possessed also of "a real and permanent, if somewhat vague, scale of values" (p. xviii). Mr. Richards is convinced that the alternative to his beliefs is (or will be) "utter chaos," and that any sort of relativity "is purely and simply a philosophy of despair" and "resolves the world into a kaleidoscope of meaningless phenomena" (p. 45). Yet he hardly attempts to prove this, and most of his argument has no need of such assumptions. He is right, no doubt, in holding that Darwinianism subverts the belief in Real Kinds and their immutability: but he should consider whether with the aid of the notion of *progress* this does not become an advantage. Also he may find that an adequate study of the logical function of variation and novelty in Darwinism would invalidate his protests against "naturalism." Lastly, he should consider whether on his own showing (p. 141) the salvation of individual souls is not both more Christian and more satisfactory than a salvation only of the Real Kind, the Platonic Universal, Man, which permits individual men to go to the devil in untold multitudes!

F. C. S. Schiller.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Books not commented on here are reserved for more extensive review.

LA PENSEE RELIGIEUSE FRANCAISE DE CHARRON A PASCAL, par *Henri Busson*. Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris. 1933. Pp. 664. 60 fr.

THE CONCEPT OF A LIMITED GOD. A Study in the Philosophy of Personalism, by *Rannie Belle Baker*. Shenandoah Publishing House, Strasburg, Virginia. 1934. Pp. 234. \$3.00.

LECTURES ON THE MEANING OF GOD IN MODERN LIFE, by *John Whittier Darr* and others. Scripps College, Claremont, California. 1933. Pp. 71.

These lectures are number five of the Scripps College Papers, and comprise the series for 1933. The general theme is of unusual interest, and the series was given by men who are masters in the subject. Professor Darr provides the lecture on *The Meaning of God for the Average Man*; Professor Story that on *The Idea of God in Modern Politics*; Professor Soares that on *The Ethical Significance of the God Experience*; and Professor Alexander that on *God and Philosophical Thinking*.

DIE IRRTUMER DER PSYCHOANALYSE. Ein Irrlehre mit Einem Genialen Kern. Von *Henrik Egyedi*. Wilhelm Braumuller, Wien und Leipzig. 1933. Pp. 286. RM 2.80.

Dr. Egyedi here discusses the errors of psychoanalysis, "a false doctrine with a kernal of genius."

THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF GIOVANNI GENTILE, by *Merritt Moor Thompson*. Southern California Education Monographs. University of Southern California Press, Los Angeles. 1934. Pp. 217. \$1.50.

THE BUNDLE OF LIFE, by *Jane Revere Burke*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. 1934. Pp. 178. \$1.50.

This purports to be the third series of messages received through a medium from William James. Were we to believe them we should have to suppose that in the spirit world Professor James has lost all the acumen and intellectual insight that characterized him in his earthly existence.

THE PATH OF PRAYER, by *Dhan Gopal Mukerji*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. 1934. Pp. 18. \$1.00.

Another of Dhan Gopal Mukerji's inimitable exhortations to devotion so much the need of a disordered world.

THE MESSAGE OF KRISHNA, by *Ardaser Sorabjee N. Wadia*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. 1934. Pp. xiv, 146. \$1.50.

This book is an attempt to interpret Hinduism in a simple and intelligible way for the benefit of those who have overlooked the nobility and beauty of the Hindu Scriptures. It is a reply to Miss Mayo's *Mother India*. The Indian spirit has been deeply wounded by that book, but it will be well if out of it they and we shall be reminded of the great popular lapse in practice from the fundamentals of Hinduism on the one hand, and of Christianity on the other.

REALITY AND ILLUSION. A New Framework of Values. By *Richard Rothschild*. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York. 1934. Pp. 442. \$3.50.

THE EMERGENCE OF NOVELTY, by *C. Lloyd Morgan*. Williams and Norgate, Ltd., London. 1933. Pp. 207. 7sh. 6d.

IGNACE PADEREWSKI, MUSICIAN AND STATESMAN, by *Rom Landau*. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 1934. Pp. 314. \$3.00.

Here we have a complete, documented, and well written life of one of the greatest geniuses of our time. Paderewsky's life is difficult to characterize by reason of his great achievements in many fields. Who would expect our greatest pianist to be also a leading statesman of the era? The world will welcome the disclosure of the more intimate details of his remarkable career.

MERIWETHER LEWIS OF LEWIS AND CLARK, by *Charles Morrow Wilson*. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. Pp. xiii, 305. \$3.00.

A fascinating rehearsal of America's first official exploring tour into the Northwest.

ESSENTIALS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION. A Philosophic and Psychological Study. By *J. E. Turner*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1934. Pp. 308. \$4.00.

WHITHER LATIN AMERICA. An Introduction to its Economic and Social Problems, by *Frank Tannenbaum*. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 1934. Pp. xix, 185. \$2.00.

In days when the United States must take an increasingly greater interest in Latin America, Dr. Tannenbaum's report on South American resources is sure to be seized with avidity by all who wish to be informed concerning our southern neighbors. The book makes no claims to solve any problems, but it raises many that are of intensest interest to North Americans.

ON BEING AND ESSENCE. St. Thomas Aquinas' *De Ente et Essentia*. Translated from the Latin by *Clare C. Riedl*. St. Michael's College, Toronto, Canada. 1934. Pp. 66.

NATURE AND LIFE, by *Alfred North Whitehead*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1934. Pp. 46. \$0.50.

THE STRUCTURE OF OUR APPREHENSION OF REALITY, by *C. Lambek*. Williams and Norgate, Ltd., London. 1933. Pp. 95. 8sh. 6d.

THE MEANING AND TRUTH OF RELIGION, by *Ernest William Lyman*. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1933. Pp. 468. \$3.00.

SCIENCE AND GOD, by *Bernhard Bavink*. Translated by *H. Stafford Hatfield*. Reynal and Hitchcock, Inc., New York. 1934. Pp. 174. \$1.50.

DAS PROBLEM DER SOZIOLOGIE DES WISSENS. Versuch einer kritischen darstellung der Wissenssoziologischen Theorien, von *Ernst Grunwald*. Wilhelm Braumuller, Vienna. 1934. Pp. viii, 279. RM 7.50.

THE UNIVERSE AND LIFE, by *H. S. Jennings*. Yale University Press, New Haven. 1933. Pp. 94. \$1.50.

- A FREE SOCIETY, by *Horace M. Kallen*. Robert O. Ballou, New York. 1934. Pp. 124. \$1.00.
- PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIETY, edited by *Charles A. Hart*. The Dolphin Press, Philadelphia. 1934. Pp. xi, 203.
- THE PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC. An Introductory Survey, by *C. A. Mace*. Longmans, Green and Company, New York. 1933. Pp. xiii, 388. \$4.50.
- THE HORIZON OF EXPERIENCE. A Philosophy for the Modern man, by *C. Delisle Burns*. W. W. Norton and Company, New York. 1934. Pp. 372. \$3.50.
- THE AIR MENACE AND THE ANSWER, by *Elvira K. Fradkin*. Introduction by James T. Shotwell. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1934. Pp. xviii, 331. \$3.00.
- LITERATURE OF THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE, by *Jefferson Butler Fletcher*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1934. Pp. 347. \$3.00.
- THE CHINESE RENAISSANCE, by *Hu Shih*. The Haskell Lectures 1933. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1934. Pp. xi, 110. \$1.50.
- ARISTOTLE. Fundamentals of the History of His Development, by *Werner Jaeger*, translated by *Richard Robinson*. Oxford at the Clarendon Press. 1934. Pp. 410. \$6.00.
- A SOCIAL BASIS OF EDUCATION, by *Harold Saxe Tuttle*. Crowell's Social Science Series, edited by *Seba Eldridge*. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 1934. Pp. x, 589. \$3.00.
- THE PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF SENSATION, by *Charles Hartshorne*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1934. Pp. xiv, 288. \$3.00.
- AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION, by *Austin F. MacDonald*. Crowell's Social Science Series, edited by *Seba Eldridge*. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 1934. Pp. xiii, 839. \$3.75.
- YOGA AND WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY, A COMPARISON, by *Geraldine Coster*. Oxford University Press, New York. 1934. Pp. 248.
- BLANKETS AND MOCCASINS, by *Gwendolin Damson Wagner* and *William A. Allen*. The Caxton Printers, Caldwell, Idaho. 1933. Pp. 304.

A historic tale having to do with the legends and struggles of the Crow Indians against their traditional enemies, the Sioux, Blackfeet, and Pawnees, as well as of their relations with the white settlers. The story is both sympathetically and skilfully told and embodies the real history of real people.

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OUR CONTRIBUTORS' PAGE

As **The Editor** turns his face towards Europe and the Far East, where he will spend nearly a year, he begins a series of articles entitled *Reflections of a Peripatetic*. In his first article The Editor suggests that it is not to the mechanism of civilization, whether expressed in chaos of war or through the steel bonds of mercantile co-operation, but to their more human and personal philosophies of life, that we must look for a rapprochement of East and West. The Editor also contributes an article entitled *Two Plus Two Equal Five*.

With this number commences a series of three complete but connected articles on *Pragmatism in the Philosophy of Borden Parker Bowne* (1847-1910) by **Dr. Edward T. Ramsdell**. The first, dealing with Bowne's religious pragmatism, establishes the philosophical proximity of the distinguished personalist to William James. Bowne writes: "God is seen to be that without which our ideals collapse or are made unattainable, and the springs of action are broken." Dr. Ramsdell's residence is in Capac, Michigan.

In *The Evolution of Plato's Republic* **Professor F. C. S. Schiller** deals with characteristic brilliance and light with what is perhaps the most original and pregnant philosophical work ever written. His analysis of Plato's Idea of the Good is particularly worthy of attention.

Poe and Dickinson, by **Mary Brent Whiteside**, is a fine and convincing comparison of "the two great individualists in American literature." In revealing the common elements which underlay their different natures she lays her finger on the pulse of the period in which they lived. Readers of *The Personalist* will remember the author's poem, *Sappho and Emily*, which appeared in *The Personalist* of June, 1933.

Knowing the Real is the title of the current article of the series of posthumous papers by **H. Wildon Carr**.

We print two sonnets, *Star-Dust* by **William van Wyck**, a former contributor, and *Sea Gull* by **Ann Fox**, who writes from New York City.